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Multidisciplinary practice (MDP) and the controversy surrounding it have ebbed
in the wake of the Enron scandal and the subsequent enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. However, legal professionals continue to debate the viability of MDP
and rules that currently prohibit lawyer fee-sharing arrangements and partner-
ships with non-lawyers- some of the rules that aim to safeguard lawyer indepen-
dence from external influences. This Article addresses one of the most common
arguments supporting MDP, namely, that the pervasive propagation of MDP in
Europe will inevitably exert an overwhelming influence and pressure to conform
on regulators of the legal profession in the United States. The Article challenges
this position by presenting a nuanced vista of the European Union's regulatory
terrain-a terrain in which MDP, though accepted domestically in some Euro-
pean Union member states, is far from being a dominant or prevalent trend.
This proposition is especially true at the EU's institutional level, where even pre-
Enron developments evinced reticence towards MDP. Toward that end, the Arti-
cle analyzes EU legislation and key decisions of the European Court of Justice in
the legal services area, as well as selected decisions of member states' courts,
indicating how those decisions reinforce the principle of lawyer independence
that lies at the root of the United States' prohibition of MDP.
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Introduction
The French lawyer is simply a man extensively acquainted with the statutes of
his country; but the English or American lawyer resembles the hierophants of
Egypt, for like them he is the sole interpreter of an occult science.1 Alexis de
Tocqueville.
Rule 5.4 of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct 2 prohibits multidisciplinary practice (MDP) 3 in the
United States. The American Bar Association's MDP Commission (the
"Commission"), established in 1998 to explore and chart the legal profes-
sion's responses to the questions raised by MDP, 4 led a recent debate con-
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 277 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
Everyman's Library 1994) (1835).
2. Rule 5.4 prohibits lawyers from sharing fees with non-lawyers, forming law part-
nerships with non-lawyers, and practicing law in a professional corporation owned or
controlled by a non-lawyer. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983). While
some states, such as New York, adopted the earlier ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility of 1969, the relevant provisions are substantively similar to the 1983 ver-
sion. Compare id. R. 5.4(a), (b), (d), respectively, with MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 3-102, 3-102(B), 5-107(C) (1980).
3. Multidisciplinary practice (MDP) may be defined as joint practice by lawyers (on
the one hand) and members of other professions (on the other hand), where their pro-
fessional activities in pursuit of such practice involve offering legal services to the pub-
lic. Depending on the context, the term may also mean the professional grouping or
entity under which or through which such joint practice is undertaken. This Article will
employ the term in both these senses even though, generally, it can also encompass joint
practice by two or more non-legal professionals. MDP must be distinguished from a
situation involving an individual professional with dual qualifications who is licensed to
practice law and another profession. Model Rule 5.7, dealing with a lawyer's responsi-
bilities regarding law-related (ancillary) services, substantially governs such a profes-
sional. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1983).
4. See ABA, About the Commission, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-abtcommis
sion.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
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cerning Rule 5.4's possible de-proscription. Although Report 10f,5 which a
group of state and local bar associations proposed and the ABA's House of
Delegates subsequently adopted in July 2000,6 formally ended the Com-
mission's work, it by no means fully resolved the questions that the Com-
mission had sought to address. Meanwhile, various states, given their
primary regulatory power over the profession, 7 and notwithstanding the
ABA's considerable influence, continued to vigorously debate the questions
through committees and commissions.
8
Following Enron's bankruptcy in December 2001, 9 and the resulting
5. This Report affirmed, among other things, that "the sharing of legal fees with
non-lawyers or permitting ownership and control of the practice of law by non-lawyers
threatens the core values of the legal profession." Annual Report of the Illinois State Bar
Association Presented Jointly with the New Jersey State Bar Association, 125 A.B.A. at 343
(2000) [hereinafter Annual Report]. By adopting Report 10f, the House of Delegates
rejected the MDP Commission's July 2000 report, which called for a relaxation of Rule
5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Proceedings for the Annual Meeting
of the House of Delegates, 125 A.B.A. at 24-25, 183 (2000). The Report discharged the
MDP Commission and ended discussions on MDP in that forum. Id. at 25. The House
of Delegates, however, went further to declare the following:
[T]he standing committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association shall, in consultation with state, local and territorial
bar associations and interested ABA sections, divisions, and committees under-
take a review of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") and shall
recommend to the House of Delegates such amendments to the MRPC as are
necessary to assure that there are safeguards in the MRPC relating to strategic
alliances and other contractual relationships with nonlegal professional service
providers consistent with the statement of principles in this Recommendation.
Id. This statement indicates a willingness to consider less radical forms of inter-profes-
sional cooperation than MDP.
6. Id. at 21-25; Annual Report, supra note 5, at 343.
7. This regulatory power is exercised by the highest court of a state (with the excep-
tion of California and New York, where legislative participation is more extensive) on the
theory that the regulation of lawyers is part of the judicial power vested in courts by
state constitutions. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
859 & n.20 (3d ed. 1999). The courts have essentially viewed the regulation of lawyers
as part of their inherent judicial authority based on the doctrine of separation of powers.
Id. at 859; see also Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation- the Role of
the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1 (1989-90) (discussing
the doctrine of inherent powers).
8. As of July 6, 2000, forty-four states and the District of Columbia had appointed
committees or task forces to consider the MDP issue and make recommendations. See
ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Report from the ABA Commission on Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstats.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2004). Arizona, Colorado, and Minnesota had taken favorable steps towards approving
pro-MDP reports issued by the committees. Id. In four other states (Maine, Oregon,
South Carolina, and South Dakota) and the District of Columbia, pro-MDP reports had
been submitted but the bars had taken no steps towards approval. Id. As of April 2,
2003, committees or other responsible authorities in seven states (Arizona, California,
Colorado, Maine, North Carolina, and South Dakota) and the District of Columbia had
taken some steps toward the ultimate approval of MDP; those in twenty-four states had
rejected MDP, and the remaining states were at various stages of disinterest or indeci-
sion. See ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, MDP Information- April 2, 2003,
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstate-summ.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
9. The tabloids in late 2001 and the first two quarters of 2002 were replete with
news items on Enron and related issues. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger et al., Staff Saw Docu-
ment Shredding at Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at A3. An early item with a measure
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accounting scandals implicating the "Big 5"10 accounting and professional
services firms, which had previously been the primary champions of MDP
in the United States,11 some of the momentum behind the quest for the de-
proscription of MDP was lost. However, as some commentators recognize,
the fundamental questions concerning MDP have not been resolved and
thus remain relevant,1 2 given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act),
the most important regulatory step taken in response to the Enron affair,
did not specifically address the question of lawyer independence. 13 The
Act merely blunted the edge of the pro-MDP movement by barring account-
ants from combining auditing functions with certain other services they
offered to public corporations. 14 However, it did not address the funda-
of comprehensiveness is The Fall of Enron, Bus. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, at 30. Good cover-
age of the matter focusing on the evolution of the accounting industry and its political
activities in pursuit of laissez-faire regulation is The Accountants' War, THE NEW YORKER,
Apr. 22 & 29, 2002, at 64.
10. The "Big 5" refers to Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Price-
waterhouseCoopers, and Arthur Andersen. Notwithstanding the functional demise of
Arthur Andersen LLP in August 2002 in the wake of the Enron scandals, I will use the
term "Big 5" throughout this Article to refer collectively to the major global accounting
firms because the term is still accepted industry-wide as a ready referent for this class of
firms, and because several of the decuments referred to in this Article reflect that
terminology.
11. Jennifer R. Garcia, Comment, Multidisciplinary Practices: What is Wrong with the
Legal Profession's Ethics Rules?, 44 ST. Louis LJ. 629, 643 (2000) (stating that "[t]he Big
Five were the first major proponents of MDPs in the United States" and for years the Big
Five have been attempting to practice law in the United States").
12. For example, section 20 1(h) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which allows accounting
firms to perform tax services for the same audit client if the client's audit committee
approves of this in advance, is of concern to those who oppose any overlap between
firms' tax and accounting functions. See Bernard Wolfman, Auditors: Stick to Your Audit-
ing, 96 TAx NOTES 298 (2002) (noting that, with regard to tax advice and tax planning,
"[t]he line between the legitimate and the questionable is sometimes clear and some-
times fuzzy," and thus implicitly recognizing that the gates have not been completely
shut against accountants on the MDP issue). See also Robert Lennon, MDP's Execution-
ers, ANt. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 18, 19 (arguing that, while many rushed to the judgment
that MDP had met its Waterloo immediately after Arthur Andersen found itself entan-
gled in the Enron scandal, MDP in the United States may yet be realized).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14. See id. § 201. Section 201 is the key section affecting MDP activities. It amends
section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 and makes it
unlawful for a registered public accounting firm (or any associated person of that firm)
that performs audit functions for issuers pursuant to federal securities laws to provide to
that issuer, contemporaneously with the audit, any non-audit service, including legal
services or any other services that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the
body established under the Act, determines to be impermissible. Id. § 78j-1(g)-(h).
However, the language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be read to permit accounting
firms to accept non-audit work, thus opening the door for their association with other
professionals, including lawyers, in performing such work. See id. § 201(b) (amending
15 U.S.C. § 7231). Specifically, the express language of section 201(b) of the Act
empowers the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to "exempt any person,
issuer, public accounting firm or transaction from the prohibition" against the provision
of certain services by accounting firms, "to the extent that such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with the protection of investors.
... Id. Thus, the Act does not permanently shut the lid against the propagation of
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mental question lying at the core of the MDP debate: Is there any basis for
shielding lawyers as a group from unrestrained collaboration with other
occupational groups through partnerships and other types of arrange-
ments? Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and related
rules explicitly state that the answer is yes,' 5 while proponents of MDP
assume the opposite. 16 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act avoids the question,
instead focusing largely on provisions aimed at enhancing auditor indepen-
dence, as distinct from lawyer independence. This situation necessitates
the continued examination of the premises underlying the MDP debate,
particularly the assumption that MDP treatment in Europe should guide
regulators of the legal profession in the United States.
Transnational practice in the international arena provides the back-
ground to the debate on MDP in the United States. This is understandable,
given that the major law firms interested in such practice constitute one of
the most influential norm-generating segments of the legal profession.
1 7
MDP by the Big 5, for the opportunity to render such services is tantamount to an
opportunity to engage in MDP, since the Act does not restrict lawyers in the same man-
ner as it does auditors. See id.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983). Implicit (and sometimes
express) in MDP opponents' arguments is the belief that the profession has features that
make it quite worthy of protection from the pernicious consequences of unrestricted
collaboration with non-lawyers. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, The Hawks of the Professional
World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1099-1106 (2000). See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Written
Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox: You've Got the Soul of the Profession in Your Hands, at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
16. Implicit in the reasoning of MDP supporters is the belief that nothing about
members of the legal profession makes them deserving of protection beyond that
afforded other players in the market; hence, the need to rid the profession of the limita-
tions on inter-professional collaboration is enshrined in Model Rule 5.4, MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983), and related rules. See, e.g., Stefan F. Tucker, Written
Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker Submitted to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice,
1999 A.B.A. SEC. L. PiAc. MGMT. ANN. MEETING 280, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/tuckerl.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
Alternatively, proponents of MDP argue that even if the legal profession deserves special
protection, sanctioning MDP would not affect its special nature. See, e.g., John S.
Dzienkowski & RobertJ. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profes-
sion: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First
Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 142 (arguing that the theory that "lawyers are special"
suffers from a number of flaws, given that law firms are already run like businesses
whose ultimate goal is maximizing profits; that profit-maximization actually benefits
clients and society; that lawyers are generally ethical regardless of the business environ-
ment in which they work; that strains on lawyer regulatory organizations existed long
before the rise of MDP; that ethical infractions will continue to be prosecuted; and that
lawyers will continue to perform pro-bono work); see also, e.g., Michele D. Beardslee, If
Multidisciplinary Partnerships Are Introduced into the United States, What Could or Should
Be the Role of General Counsel? 9 FORDaitAJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 37 (2003) (arguing that
if MDP were adopted in the United States, there is no reason why law firms could not
easily prevent ethical violations from occurring). For example, "General Counsel would
be well-situated within a law firm environment to help both the client and the MDP
professionals overcome the ethical hurdles around: 1) confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege, 2) lawyer independence, and 3) conflicts of interest"). Id. at 37.
17. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER at xi (1988) ("The large law firm
has ... been a central institution in the development of the distinctive norms and cul-
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Significantly, international transactional practice constitutes a major, if not
the major, point of interest for the Big 5 firms in their quest to capitalize on
MDP.18 Proponents of MDP point to developments within the European
Union ("EU") as a focal point of their deregulation platform because of
such developments' perceived capacity to influence the MDP debate in the
United States. 19 In so doing, they often rely on the premise that MDP has
become a fait accompli within the EU. 20
This Article examines and challenges that premise by surveying the
EU regulatory terrain, a terrain in which MDP, though accepted domesti-
cally in some EU states, is far from dominant or prevalent, particularly at
the EU institutional level. Toward that end, the Article analyzes EU legisla-
tion and decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the legal ser-
vices area, as well as selected decisions of member states' courts, focusing
on how these decisions reinforce, rather than undermine, the principle of
lawyer independence that lies at the root of the prohibition of MDP in the
United States
Part I of this Article explores the general terrain of transnational prac-
tice-the context in which MDP questions primarily arise. It shows how
developments in transnational practice in the era of globalization can
deceptively engender the notion that the general trend in the EU toward the
more liberal regulation of professions portends the acceptance of MDP by
regulators in the United States and other countries. Part II explores the
regulatory situation in the EU and its member states in connection with
their attempts to grapple with MDP. These attempts are relevant both
because of the EU's intrinsic value as a major international legal market
experienced in MDP and because its responses to MDP issues facilitate
reflection on the future of MDP in the United States.
tural understandings that define the ideal of professionalism for American lawyers
...."), quoted in Note, Why Law Firms Cannot Afford to Maintain the Mommy Track, 109
HA v. L. REv. 1375, 1378 n.19 (1996).
18. See Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition from Accounting Firms
May Help Corporate Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical High Ground, 20 PACE L. REv 43,
48-50 (noting that "[tlhroughout the world, the Big Five accounting firms are aggres-
sively competing with law firms for legal business .... MDPs [i.e., major accounting
firms offering legal services] often advise on complex, international transactions for
highly sophisticated clients involving an inextricable mix of finance, accounting, law
and other disciplines") (quoting Tucker, supra note 16, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
tuckerl.html) (internal quotations omitted).
19. For example, developments within the Paris Bar were crucial in directing the
attention of the U.S. legal profession towards MDPs. Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristo-
crat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Part-
nerships in the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom After the
Disintegration of Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 589, 606 (2002).
20. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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1. Transnational Practice and the Debate on Multidisciplinary
Practice: The Current Context
A. Liberalization and Its Implications for Deontology
1. The Current Contours of Transnational Practice
International legal practice has always been peculiar as an apparent
sub-disciplinary focus of practicing lawyers. It is perhaps the only practice
area where practitioners do not share a common core of substantive legal
knowledge underpinning their endeavors. In the case of a corporate law-
yer, for instance, corporate law and related substantive areas of knowledge
undergird his practice. In contrast, while international law may be a dis-
tinct area of academic inquiry, and even practice in a limited sense, 2 1 it is
not the substantive focal point of international law practitioners. Rather,
international lawyers are defined by the locus of their practice and the
entailed processes. They typically deal with legal issues straddling political
and jurisdictional boundaries because of the peculiarities of the involved
parties, objects, conduct, and effects. The process typically involves an
interface with a wide spectrum of people, places, and institutions, often
necessitating extensive travel to and interaction with disparate lands and
cultures, which lend international law an exotic hue that many find allur-
ing. This exotic and somewhat glamorous hue is perhaps another peculiar-
ity of this practice precisely because it evokes images of travel to distant
lands and make-or-break negotiations upon which the fate of people and
enterprises rest. This perception is especially evident in the context of the
transnational practice of business law.
As exotic as it may appear and although its growth has primarily
occurred since the 1980s, 22 transnational practice is not new. 2 3 However,
21. Diplomats and their advisors are exceptions to this rule; they deal with substan-
tive international law issues, and thus may accurately be labeled "international law
practitioners."
22. See Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STANFORD L. REV 1789,
1798 (2003) (arguing that international law's "exponential growth" is evidence of "an
emerging sense of global community") (quoting THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 5-6, 10-11 (1995)). Laurel S. Terry notes the acceleration
of transnational practice and gives statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Economic Analysis, which "show[s] a twenty-fold increase-from $97 million
to $1.9 billion-between 1986 and 1996 with respect to the export of U.S. legal ser-
vices." Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Paris Forum on Transnational Practice for
the Legal Profession, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1999). Likewise, "[t]he U.S. import of
foreign legal services also grew significantly from 1986 to 1996, increasing from $40
million to $516 million." Id. at 4. Notwithstanding this high rate of growth, most law-
yers still work within the confines of their countries' borders, and transnational practice
still constitutes a relatively small-although important-segment of the legal services
market. Id. at 5.
23. See Richard L. Abel, The Future of the Legal Profession: Transnational Law Practice,
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 738 (1994) (noting that "Coudert [Brothers] opened its
Paris office more than a century ago"). Behind this specific piece of statistical informa-
tion is the broader fact that with the wave of legal expansion during the colonial times of
the mid- and late nineteenth century, transnational practice evolved as well. Id. at
742-43. This was certainly so in the regions constituting the then British empire, with
incessant appeals to the Privy Council sitting in London and the attendant need to pro-
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it is transnational practice's rapid growth-more than the actual substance
of the practice-that has attracted the attention of lawyers and laypersons
during the last three decades. The developments constituting this growth
include the opening of new law offices in major cities around the world,2 4
heightened inter-firm alliances across jurisdictions,25 the stream of note-
worthy law firm mergers, 2 6 the emergence of new arenas of transnational
practice, 2 7 and the emergence of international agencies and forums
addressing transnational practice and allied issues. 28
The recent growth in international legal practice is a paradigm shift for
the legal profession, considering how this growth has changed the way the
profession is organized and regulated. 2 9 This paradigm shift becomes con-
siderably accentuated when viewed within the broader context of globaliza-
tion. For international lawyers, globalization has added a sense of urgency
to the process of internationalizing their practice, rendering imperative
what were, until just a few years ago, optional indicia of professional pro-
gress. For example, potential clients may treat the number of foreign
offices a firm boasts as a proxy for that firm's stability, in terms of its
cure the services of British attorneys. See Barry Phillips, British Commonwealth Case
Note, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 775, 775 (1994). Indeed, some British lawyers exercised an early,
even if formally unarticulated, form of the right of establishment and set up practices
within the colonies. Abel alludes to this broader point when he writes of the "continuing
role of Parisian firms in Francophone Africa" and the "roving band of QCs who accept
briefs throughout the former Empire." Abel, supra, at 743.
Of course, it could be argued that such activity was not transnational in nature, given
that the transactions involved procurement of legal services from within the same juris-
diction-i.e., the British Empire. This is, however, debatable, given that the relationship
between Britain and the constituent territories of the empire was variegated: some were
colonies, while others were protectorates under Britain's influence but not formal legal
suzerainty. An example of the latter is Brunei, which voluntarily sought British protec-
tion in 1888 and became a protectorate out of fear of absorption by Sarawak, retaining
its status as a Sultanate. See ASHISH NANDA, THE SAGA OF PRINCE JEFRI AND KPMG (A):
MYSTERY OF THE MISSING BILLIONS 1 (1999).
24. Randall S. Thomas et. al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115, 138-146 (2001).
25. See Law Firm Networks, PARTNER'S REPORT FOR LAW FI m OWNERS, Mar. 2004, at
8.
26. Although the overall annual number of firm mergers has declined in the past few
years, Christine Hines, Special Report, Think. Then Act; Law Firms Witnessed a Few
Famous Flameouts-and So They Grew Cautiously, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at 35,
some observers believe the current economic downturn will "encourage more law firm
mergers, including unions between some of the huge international firms .... David E.
Rovella, Living on the Edge, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at A24.
27. One noteworthy example of the constantly expanding and evolving nature of
transnational practice involves the new legal relationship among the three NAFTA coun-
tries. As Mark A. Drumbl points out, "NAFTA creates a demand for lawyers in one
NAFTA jurisdiction who can advise clients in another NAFTA jurisdiction regarding the
law of one of the other NAFTA parties, or on matters of the new NAFTA supra-law."
Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School Curriculum for Free Markets
and Open Borders, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1053, 1056 (1998).
28. See, e.g., Donald H. Rivkin, Transnational Legal Practice, 32 INT'L LAW. 423, 425
(1998) (discussing the advent of the Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal
Profession).
29. See Gloria M. Sanchez, A Paradigm Shift in Legal Education: Preparing Law Stu-
dents for the Twenty-First Century: Teaching Foreign Law, Culture, and Legal Language of
the Major U.S. American Trading Partners, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 635, 640-41 (1997).
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diversification across geographical and legal boundaries and the diversity
of its local clientele. 30 Cross-border marketing of services is similarly no
longer a cavalierly undertaken sideshow, but a major aspect of a firm's
long-term strategy. 3 1 The perceived globalization of the legal world, there-
fore, compels practitioners and even academic administrators to respond to
new developments in the international arena. 32 Richard Abel captures this
air of excitement and compulsion:
[Clompetitive pressures inspire fear-even terror-of being left out of merg-
ers. Law firms sometimes appear to be seized by the adolescent angst that all
your friends are at a party to which you haven't been invited-it is unbear-
able not to be there, even if you know you would have a terrible time. For
many American firms, the foreign office is a loss leader, an outpost to enter-
tain visiting firemen, a way of showing the flag, an address to add to the
letterhead and a discreet form of advertising. 3 3
Vagts writes along the same lines:
One hears a great deal about the globalization of the law. As I write, I have
before me the holiday greetings card of a major law firm showing a map of
the world with star-like points of light to indicate where its offices are
located. As a professor of law I am the target of glossy brochures from differ-
ent law schools announcing how global they have become, with students
30. See Abel, supra note 23, at 739-40 (postulating that the rapid growth of transna-
tional practice may to some extent be because "new offices in exotic locations constitute
surrogate measures of the quality of legal services, which is very hard to evaluate" and
"[b]eing the first on your block to open in a country or city offers an added cachet" and
"can confer unique privileges"); see also Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the Inter-
national Market for Legal Services, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 504 (2003). Silver
notes that all seventy-one of the firms she examined, which were among "the largest and
most international law firms," supported at least one foreign office in 2000, up from
forty-three in 1985. Id. The total number of foreign offices for these firms in 2000 was
343, almost triple the 1985 figure. Id.
31. It is almost inconceivable for a major international law firm to be without an
Internet website or marketing personnel. Besides being another surrogate index of qual-
ity, a website is a veritable global marketing tool. See Michael M. Boone & Terry W.
Conner, Change, Change, and More Change: The Challenge Facing Law Firms, 63 TEx. B. J.
18, 24 (2000) (noting that "[tihe Internet will become increasingly powerful in market-
ing and delivering legal services because of its easy access, speed, and unlimited bound-
aries" and that "[b]randing will become more important as major law firms attempt to
establish dominant regional, national, or international franchises").
32. Abel, supra note 23, at 741; Dr. Charlotte Ku & Christopher J. Borgen, American
Lawyers and International Competence, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 493, 503 (2000) (noting that
the "proliferation of international courses" at law schools has not been accompanied by
an increase in student enrollment in those courses, indicating that the degree of compul-
sion felt by academic administrators is not proportionally related to actual student
interest).
33. Abel, supra note 23, at 741. That foreign offices tend to be loss leaders initially
is not news to scholars of the professions. Indeed, it is to be expected. That Abel seem-
ingly regards such losses as detracting from the functionality of such offices is, however,
curious and perhaps represents the sort of thinking that has led to the relatively stunted
international presence of law firms vis-a-vis advertising, accounting, and consulting
firms. See generally id. at 745. A foreign office, even if permanently a loss leader, can
nevertheless be an indispensable strategic tool that enables a firm to obtain competitive
leverage in the cross training of professionals and in the global quest for new clients and
engagements and the defense of existing ones.
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and visiting faculty from all over the world and a wide range of courses on
international and comparative law. All of that runs parallel with the percep-
tion that the world's economy is becoming one unified whole, freed from
nationalistic limitations and tied together by a radically new set of
technologies. 3
4
Freedom from nationalistic limitations borne on the wings of radically
new technologies is an essence of the liberalization that constitutes a major
component of globalization.3 5 Globalization is the progressive construc-
tion of a global village atop deconstructed nationalities. Such deconstruc-
tion eliminates the rules that once helped to shape peoples and entities
from different jurisdictions and kept them distinct through regulation of
their interactions, whether in commerce, leisure or otherwise.
3 6
The arena of deconstruction includes such agencies of global econom-
ics and politics as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), the EU, the Organization of United Nations (UN), the
World Trade Organization (WTO), numerous non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and other agencies around the globe. Several functions of
these bodies, ranging from the drafting of uniform laws and multilateral
agreements to litigation and mobilization of international civil society,
increasingly constrain the independence of individual states while liberal-
izing international activities. 3 7 Professions and professional services have
received generous attention from these agencies, especially in the context
of the new focus on services as objects of international trade, first within
the EU,3 8 and subsequently within the WT0 3 9 and the OECD. 40 Such
34. Detlev F. Vagts, The Impact of Globalization on the Legal Profession, in THE INTER-
NATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 31 (Jens Drolshammer & Michael Pfeiffer eds.,
2001).
35. Id.
36. See Bernard L. Greer, Jr., Professional Regulation and Globalization: Toward a Bet-
ter Balance, in GLOBAL LAW IN PRACTICE 182-83 (J. Ross Harper ed., 1997) (arguing that
the transition from national to super-national regulation in the wake of MDP is neces-
sary because "protectionist concerns" are subservient to "public interests, including the
interests of the increasing numbers of direct participants in the global economy"), quoted
in Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the Global Practice of
Law?, 34 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 931, 937 n.28 (2001).
37. See Donald M. McRae, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 981, 984 (2001) (book review) (review-
ing THE EU, THE WTO AND NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE?
(J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000) (observing that "[hiarmonizing domestic regulation as a result
of the expanding ambit of trade regulation has implications for the autonomy of states
and raises questions about the concept of statehood under international law").
38. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Nov. 10 1997, OJ. (C 340/03), art. 49 (ex Article 59), 55 (ex Article 66) (1997) [herein-
after EC TREATY] (freedom to provide services).
39. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Makkaresh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/26-gats.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
40. See Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1547, 1549
nn.4 & 5 (2000) (noting that following the adoption of the GATS, the OECD held con-
ferences in 1995, 1996, 1997 to reduce barriers to trade in professional services and
that the GATS Working Party on Professional Services, predecessor of the Working Party
on Domestic Regulations, has leveraged on the work of these conferences). See generally
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ["OECD"], LIBERALIZATION
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attention and the attendant liberalization have constituted the crucible
within which developments relating to MDP have been propagated.
Together with the technologies that propel them, these forces frame the
global contention on MDP 4 t and provide psychological reinforcement-if
not impetus-for MDP proponents, as indicated by the discussion below.
2. Multidimensional Liberalization: Cross-Jurisdictional and Cross-
Professional
The internationalization of legal practice has resulted in the prolifera-
tion of questions of deontology concerning the professional rules that gov-
ern lawyers practicing in jurisdictions with different regulatory regimes. 42
When, for instance, is a lawyer who is admitted in one jurisdiction author-
ized to practice law in another, and with what safeguards and limitations?
Which jurisdiction's rules govern a lawyer's conduct when he practices
outside the jurisdiction of his bar admission? Do the ordinary rules of
OF TRADE IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES (1995); OECD, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES: ASSESSING BARRIERS AND ENCOURAGING REFORM 2 (1996); OECD PROCEEDINGS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: ADVANCING LIBERALIZATION THROUGH
REGULATORY REFORM 2 (1997).
41. For a sampling of the contentious and often inconclusive writings on MDP, see,
for example, Thomas R. Andrews, Non-Lawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 578-79 (1989) (arguing that it
does not necessarily follow from the prohibition against the practice of law by non-
lawyers that lawyers should not provide expertise in non-legal capacities); Daniel Bren-
nan & Ramon Mullerat, Financial Threat to Impartial Justice, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at
14 (arguing that, among other potential problems, an MDP regime would compromise
the attorney-client privilege and lawyers' ethical duties); Charles L. Brieant, Is It the End
of the Legal World as We Know It?, 20 PACE L. REV. 21, 24-25, 31 (1999) (arguing that the
fact that many lawyers have themselves chosen to step outside traditional areas of legal
practice and instead offer expertise in other capacities such as business consultants
demonstrates that the legal profession is going through a natural evolution that regula-
tors should not thwart); Michael Chambers, American Lawyers Say 'No!': Another Setback
for Accountants, COM. LAW. (London), Sept. 1999, at 40, (arguing that the ABA's MDP
commission was ill-equipped to discharge its responsibility of reviewing the ABA's policy
regarding MDPs); Jack F. Dunbar, Multidisciplinary Practice Translated Means "Let's Kill
All the Lawyers," 79 MICH. BJ. 64, 67 (2000) (summarizing various writers' viewpoints
on MDP and arguing that no one has proven that clients prefer "one-stop shopping," and
that the conflicts of interest inherent in MDPs are irreconcilable); Gary A. Munneke,
Lawyers, Accountants, and the Battle to Own Professional Services, 20 PACE L. REv. 73, 83
(1999) (arguing that regulation of non-legal professionals is crucial to set the bounda-
ries of the legal profession, many of which do not change through the generations);
Darryl Van Duch, Big Six in Hot Pursuit of Legal Biz, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at Al
(reporting that the lines demarcating law firms from accounting firms have become
blurred in recent years); Talha A. Zobair, Multidisciplinary Practices- Firms of the Future,
79 MICH. B.J. 64, 65 (2000) (arguing that cost-conscious corporations are turning to
MDPs in order to eliminate the transaction costs imbedded in employing multiple profes-
sional organizations and increase efficiency).
42. Timothy P. Terrell asserts that MDP is the only area of legal practice in which
individual lawyers-as well as factions within the ABA-diverge dramatically with regard
to questions of legal ethics. Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative Core of Lawyer-
ing: Uncomfortable Lessons from the "Metaethics" of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY LJ. 87, 94
n.24 (2000).
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conflict of laws apply?4 3 International lawyers and their organizations, in
conjunction with national and supranational authorities, have tackled
these and related questions, primarily through various professional codes,
supranational legislation, and bilateral agreements. 44 This has resulted in
the progressive relaxation of several countries' rules, enabling lawyers to
practice across jurisdictions. 4 5 Such relaxation constitutes the legal basis
underlying the proliferation of branch offices of international law firms
around the globe and, to a lesser extent, the migration of lawyers across
jurisdictions.4 6
In addition to this liberalization along jurisdictional lines (cross-juris-
dictional liberalization) is liberalization along a second axis: cross-profes-
sional liberalization. Only the concurrence of these two forms of
liberalization could ground lawyers' projection of self and activities across
boundaries. In essence, this concurrence is a sine qua non for the global-
ization of legal services.
With regard to transnational legal practice, cross-professional liberali-
zation is necessitated by differences in education, function, and even the
public perception of lawyers in various jurisdictions. 4 7 For example, the
training given to an English solicitor 48 is distinct from that of a French
conseil juridique,49 not to mention that of a German Rechtsanwalt,5 0 even if
arguably their functions overlap. Likewise, a New York notary is clearly
43. For a well-rounded analysis of these issues, see Detlev F. Vagts, Professional
Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
677, 689 (2000).
44. See id. at 689-94 (discussing Rule 8.5 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, provisions of the Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community,
and Article 6 of the EU Directive 98/5 [hereinafter the Establishment Directive]). Rule
8.5 addresses questions of jurisdiction and conflict of laws in inter-state practice, and
Article 6 of the Establishment Directive prescribes rules for EU lawyers practicing in a
host state under their home state professional titles. Id. at 690-93. For an example of a
bilateral agreement, see the agreement between the American Bar Association and the
Brussels Bar Councils, approved by the ABA Board of Governors on August 3, 1994, in
New Orleans, Louisiana. Annual Report of the Board of Governers, 119 A.B.A. REP. 69
(1994).
45. For a summary of the evolution of legal structures within different states and the
attempts to bridge the gaps, see HAsisti ADAMSON, FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS 7-11 (2d
ed. 1998).
46. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 88 n.29 (noting the demand for
cross-border legal services) (citing E. Leigh Dance, How to Compete with MDPs, 13 MAR-
KETING FOR LAWYER 3 (1999)).
47. Id. (pointing out that "[t]he precise parameters of the practice of law are not
easily articulated," in that the range of definitions inquires into "whether a person is
acting in a representative fashion, whether a person is counseling or advising another in
connection with their legal rights and duties, whether one is exercising legal judgment,
and whether the relationship is one of trust based on legal advice) (internal quotations
omitted).
48. See Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Justifications for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1191, 1222-23 (1995) (discussing the stages of education and training
required in order to practice as a solicitor).
49. John Cary Sims, Book Review, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 395, 397-98 (2003). In
1992, the profession of conseiljuridique, or French legal advisers, was fused with that of
avocat to form a single profession. ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 14-15.
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not of the same caliber as a German Notar, though the similarity in their
titles may suggest otherwise. 5 1
Furthermore, even though equivalents of the term "lawyer" exist in
various languages, their meanings are not interchangeable, because lawyers
from different jurisdictions often do not perform exactly the same range of
functions. 52 Indeed, the legal profession in many countries is variegated,
quite unlike the unified profession in the United States.5 3 In many coun-
tries, for instance, at least two distinct legal professions exist: one often
deals with litigation and related issues, while the other deals with commer-
cial transactions. For example, before their reform and unification
between 1971 and 1992, at least five branches of the legal profession
existed in France: the avocat, avou, notaire, conseil juridique, and huissier
dejustice.5 4 The conseil juridique, whose closest common law equivalent is
the English solicitor, handled non-litigation advisory work and did not
require legal training.55 Sweden presents a current example of a country
where people without legal training may perform non-litigation legal
work.5 6 As a final twist, while most European countries require that pro-
spective lawyers have professional experience before joining a legal profes-
sion, in Spain one may become an abogado without having any prior
experience.5 7
Given these differences in the structure of the legal profession in many
countries, the implementation of a uniform code of regulations has
required legal professionals from disparate jurisdictions to dispense with
or de-emphasize features of their practice that were previously essential to
50. Dr. Martin Henssler & Laurel S. Terry, Lawyers Without Frontiers- a View from
Germany, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269, 285-86 (2001).
51. Carol D. Rasnic, Book Review, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.. 149, 149 n.1 (1993)
(explaining that the "Notar in Germany bears little resemblance to its American counter-
part, the notary").
52. See generally Kelly Charles Crabb, Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Coun-
tries: Making Room for the American Attorney, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1767, 1779-83 (1983)
(contrasting the practice of law in five countries).
53. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amend-
ment, 78 IowA L. REV. 433, 448 (1993) (noting that the Founding Fathers specifically
intended the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), to abolish the traditional British
distinction between solicitors and barristers and unify the profession so that "members
of both branches were accorded the right to appear in federal courts") (quoting Solina v.
United States, 709 F.2d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1983)). Colonial New York however, did
have a division between barristers and solicitors, identical to England. Brieant, supra
note 41, at 21.
54. See New York State Bar Association Special Committee on the Law Governing
Firm Structure and Operation, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profes-
sion: The Place of Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers, 193-94, 193
n.16 (2000) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
55. See discussion infra Part II.C regarding the reforms in the French legal system.
56. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAW GOVERNING
FIRM STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, REPORT 275 (2000).
57. Dr. Julian Lonbay, Lawyer Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: The Global Practice
Reconciling Regulatory and Deontological Differences- The European Experience, 34 VND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 907, 910 (2001).
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their identities. 58 This has been especially true in Europe, where recent
Council Directives 59 and decisions of the European Court of Justice in the
area of lawyer regulation required abandoning or modifying long-standing
features of the legal professions in member states.60 The ECJ decisions,
58. See, e.g., Shigeru Kobori, Paris Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal
Profession, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 109, 122-23 (1999). In arguing that MDP will perni-
ciously cause lawyers to become divorced from their function as advocates of the public
interest in their particular country of origin, Kobori states as follows:
Each nation has its own unique legal system imposing its own particular ethical
and social responsibilities on its lawyers, and these stem from its own history
and culture. These responsibilities may not necessarily be identical to those of
another nation's legal system. In this light, it is, in principle, reasonable not to
permit a lawyer qualified to practice law in one country ... to exert control over
lawyers in another country ... by owning or investing in their law firms.
Id.
59. See Council Directive 77/249, 1977 OJ. (L 78) 17 [hereinafter Lawyers' Services
Directive]; Council Directive 89/48, 1989 OJ. (L 19) 16 [hereinafter Diplomas Direc-
tive]; and Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 36.
60. Pertinent ECJ decisions include Case C-2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974
E.C.R. 631 (striking down the requirement that bar applicants be nationals of the host
state); Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-
nijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1975) (Neth.) (striking down the require-
ments that bar applicants be residents of the host state); Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil
de l'ordre des avocats i la Cour de Paris, 1977 E.C.R. 765, ' 19 (holding that it is an
unjustified restriction on freedom of establishment for a host member state to deny
admission to a particular profession to an EU citizen who holds a diploma that the host
state's competent [academic] authority recognizes as an equivalent qualification, and
who has also fulfilled the specific conditions regarding professional training in force in
that host country, solely because the person concerned does not possess the host state
diploma corresponding to the diploma which he holds); Case 107/83, Ordre des Avocats
au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2971, ' 22 (invalidating as restrictive of
the right of establishment a 1972 rule of the Paris bar which stipulated that an avocat
can establish chambers only in one place, which must be within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the regional court where he is registered); Case 292/86, Gullung v. Conseil de
l'ordre des avocats du barreau de Colmar et de Saverne, 1988 E.C.R. 111 (holding that a
person who is a national of two member states and who has been admitted to a legal
profession in one of those states may rely, in the territory of the other state, upon the
provisions of the Lawyers' Services Directive if he satisfies the conditions for the applica-
tion of the directive); Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium ffir Justiz, 1991
E.C.R. 1-2357 (taking the Thieffry decision further by ruling that Article 52 of the EEC
Treaty requires the national authorities of a host member state to examine the compati-
bility between the diploma requirements of the host member state and the country of
origin, where a lawyer admitted in his country of origin applies to practice as a legal
advisor (i.e., foreign legal consultant) in the host member state, and in so doing, effec-
tively sidestepping the requirement in Thieffry that the competent authority in the host
state recognize the academic equivalence of the foreign diploma to that of the host state
before the applicant can seek professional recognition of the diploma). Case Sdger v.
Dennemeyer & Co. involved a claim by a German Patentanwalt (patent agent) that a UK
company's offering of computerized patent-monitoring and renewal services remotely
from the UK into Germany infringed German legislation reserving such services to
specified German professionals. C-76/90, SAger v. Dennemeyer & Co., 1991 E.C.R.
1-4221. The ECJ held that Article 59 of the EEC Treaty precludes provisions of a mem-
ber state that prohibit a company established in another member state from providing
such services; such a prohibition is disproportionate to the member state's interest in
protecting its consumers from unqualified service providers, given the character of the
services at issue, which did not involve providing professional opinions but rather sim-
ple ministerial acts of notification and renewal. Id. 20. See also Case C-55/94, Geb-
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spanning two decades, established and sustained a tendency toward pro-
gressive liberalization of the EU regime for lawyer regulation. 6 1 However,
notwithstanding the abiding influence of these cases, the liberalization
they embody no longer proceeds apace, as indicated by the cases examined
in Part II.D of this Article.
The foregoing adjustments and modifications to the structures of the
different legal professions raise conceptual issues which may implicate and
ground arguments for the de-proscription of MDP. Since the EU maintains
a lead in the ongoing liberalization of lawyer regulatory regimes around the
world, it becomes inevitably an attractive reference point for constituencies
interested in exploring and advancing the notion that the heightened liber-
alization of lawyer regulatory regimes necessarily implies the liberalization
of the restrictions against MDP. While this notion is erroneous, this Arti-
cle proceeds by making the best possible case for such a notion by explor-
ing, in Part L.B below, the way in which the pervasive air of liberalization
can engender such a notion by raising cardinal questions concerning the
regulatory treatment of similarly-situated professions. This is in essence
an attempt to account for the existence of that notion.
B. Functional Equivalence and Equal Treatment of Professions
The pervasive air of liberalization apparent in the EU institutions'
work in the area of legal services, as well as the activities of bar associa-
tions in the EU and beyond, seemingly provide a reinforced pedestal to
claims in favor of de-proscribing MDP. This situation stems from foreign
lawyers' natural interest in seeking equal treatment vis-a-vis local law-
hard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165.
Gebhard involved a disciplinary action against a German lawyer on the grounds that he
pursued a professional activity in Italy on a permanent basis in chambers set up by
himself using the title avvocato and appearing before Milan courts, contrary to 1982
Italian legislation implementing the Lawyers' Services Directive that, while authorizing
other member states' lawyers to pursue lawyers' professional activities in Italy on a tem-
porary basis, barred them from permanently establishing a practice in Italy. Id. at I-
4168-71. The ECJ, while declining to pronounce expressly on the propriety of the spe-
cific Italian measures in issue, took pains to expound upon several important issues of
Community law in this area. See id. at 1-4171-75. Among other points, it opined that the
Treaty chapters on the free movement of workers, the right of establishment, and the
provision of services are all mutually exclusive; that laws protecting the freedom of
establishment apply equally to resident nationals of other member states as to that
state's own nationals; and that national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive
the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfill four condi-
tions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by
imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is
necessary in order to attain that objective. Id.
61. See Robert K. Christensen, Note, At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue
After the ABA's Recommendation: States Finding Solutions by Taking Stock in European
Harmonization to Preserve Their Sovereignty in Regulating the Legal Profession, 2001 BYU
L. REv. 375, 396-97 (discussing the European Union's approaches to harmonization of
the legal profession).
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yers.6 2 Technically, foreign lawyers are not considered lawyers of the for-
eign jurisdiction in which they seek recognition and rights of practice.
Indeed, the lay character of a foreign lawyer vis-a-vis a domestic lawyer in a
jurisdiction in which the former seeks recognition is accentuated because,
under the current EU regime, the foreign lawyer does not have to seek
admission to that branch of the domestic jurisdiction's legal profession
that corresponds to the branch of his home country's legal profession. For
example, a Spanish abogado, instead of seeking recognition or registration
as an advocate in Ireland, may seek recognition or registration as a solici-
tor, although the Irish solicitor is closer to a Spanish procurador6 3 than an
abogado. This situation is further complicated in some countries where the
legal profession is closely aligned with certain professions that are
regarded as distinct in other countries. For example, the German Wirt-
schaftsprufer (auditor) and Steuerberater (tax adviser) are regarded as
quasi-legal professions closely related to the legal profession.6 4
62. The agitation for equal treatment is true as well for lawyers hailing from jurisdic-
tions within the same country, as is the case with attorneys licensed in different states of
the United States. Some courts have been receptive to these concerns. See In re Waring,
221 A.2d 193, 197 (1966) (finding that "legal services to New Jersey residents with
respect to New Jersey matters may ordinarily be furnished only by New Jersey counsel;
but ... there may be multistate transactions where strict adherence to this thesis would
not be in the public interest"). However, in a more recent and widely noted case, Bir-
brower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia upheld lower courts' decisions holding that a fee agreement for legal services
performed partly in New York and partly in California by lawyers licensed to practice in
New York, was unenforceable as to the portion of the services rendered in California,
because the New York lawyer had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by render-
ing his services in California. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C v. Supe-
rior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
63. That the Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 59, and subsequent measures
did not recognize the Spanish procurador and similar professional titles in other civil lawjurisdictions does not attenuate the force of this example. See ADAMSON, supra note 45,
at 8-9, 26, 46 (discussing the nature of the procurador's functions and its non-recogni-
tion under the Lawyers' Services Directive). What is significant is that the Spanish abo-
gado can cross over to a branch of the Irish legal profession (solicitor) that is far removed
om the branch of the Spanish legal profession that originally admitted him.
64. ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 18. This nexus between auditing and legal work in
Germany explains the accommodation traditionally afforded MDP under German law.
See Terry, supra note 40, at 1560-67 (discussing the regulation of MDP in Germany
where there have been no restrictions against such practice structures). This example is
without prejudice to the fact that under the Lawyers' Services Directive and the Estab-
lishment Directive as well as ECJ jurisprudence, only the mainstream legal professions-
barrister, solicitor, avocat, and related titles-are recognized as the subject of the EU's
regime of lawyer regulation. See Lawyers' Services Directive, 59, at 17; Establishment
Directive, supra note 44, at 38. The work of the notary is, for instance, taken as an
aspect of the respective states' public functions that should not be amenable to such
regulation. See Pedro A. Malavet, The Foreign Notarial Legal Services Monopoly: Why
Should We Care?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 945, 945 (1998) (noting that the rationale for
this distinction is that "[n]otarial functions may still be reserved to enrolled lawyers, as
with Services. This is because notaries deal with national matters of public law, espe-
cially the transfer and ownership of immovable property within State boundaries")
(quoting JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAw 193 (2d. ed. 1990)). But see Laura
Picchio Forlati, Cross-Border Licensing, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 373, 382 (2002) (arguing that
in the case of Italian notaries, "the exercise of a public function such as authentication
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It should be noted that the question of recognition to practice law in a
jurisdiction is conceptually distinct from that of the organizational form
that such practice should take. Thus, recognizing foreign lawyers as quali-
fied for admission to a member state's bar is not tantamount to permitting
them to form partnerships with domestic lawyers-the latter is the MDP
question. By contrast, the question of admission is related to issues sur-
rounding the unauthorized practice of law. That said, both issues overlap
in the context of the present inquiry, in that the EU has not restricted liber-
alization only to the recognition of a foreign lawyer's right to practice in
another jurisdiction, but it has also extended it to the right of such a lawyer
to form partnerships and other associations with local lawyers 6 5 because
of his status as a non-lawyer in the foreign jurisdiction.
A question that naturally arises is whether the standing of a foreign
lawyer, seeking recognition in another jurisdiction, is materially different
from that of another professional, say an accountant (foreign or domestic),
seeking recognition to offer legal services in the same jurisdiction-espe-
cially those services that lie at the boundary between law and other profes-
sions. This question extends to situations where such recognition is
sought by an entity comprised of individuals who belong to different pro-
fessions-that is, an MDP. The movement towards cross-jurisdictional rec-
ognition of lawyers, which examines differences and similarities of legal
professions across jurisdictions, opens up the wider question of the simi-
larity of qualifications across professional lines: Is it not possible that other
professions (domestic or foreign) could possess some of the very character-
istics that make the foreign lawyer comparable to the domestic lawyer? If
regulators in a given jurisdiction are able to examine and consider the dis-
parate qualifications of lawyers from various foreign jurisdictions in order
to ascertain whether such lawyers are comparable with or equivalent to
domestic lawyers, surely they should not be averse to objectively compar-
ing domestic lawyers with non-legal professionals to ascertain whether
they too possess any equivalent expertise. After all, the non-lawyer is no
more a lay person than the foreign lawyer. The cross-jurisdictional and the
cross-professional dimensions of the issue thus converge.
Evidence of this convergence can be found in the inclusion of non-EU
lawyers-who for this purpose are akin to non-recognized foreign lawyers
vis-d-vis EU domestic lawyers-in a lawyers' multinational partnership
(MNP), rendering MNPs subject to Article 11(5) of the Establishment
Directive, which deals with MDPs.66 In essence, a combination involving
of documents could be performed just as well by a duly qualified citizen of another
Member State").
65. See generally ADAMSON, supra note 45 (giving details of the types of associations
and practice groupings facilitated by the EU regime). Notable among these are practice
groupings that include two or more lawyers from the same country, such as the Euro-
pean Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) created by European Council Regulation
(EEC) 2137/85 in July 1985. Id. at 149-50. In the same vein, although English barris-
ters may not form partnerships with members of any other profession, including English
solicitors, foreign lawyers may form partnerships with such solicitors. Id. at 28.
66. Id. at 154.
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an EU lawyer and a non-EU lawyer is ipso facto an MDP, just as would be a
combination between a Belgian lawyer and a Spanish lawyer under Belgian
law but for the recent liberalization. 6 7 The MDP question, therefore, is per-
vasive and unavoidable, lodged at the very center of current efforts to facili-
tate the cross-jurisdictional projection of lawyers and their activities.
Getting more specific, one can indeed extend to MDPs important ques-
tions already raised regarding MNPs. Analyzing the special difficulties
troubling the international practice of American law firms, Vagts considers
an arrangement between an American firm and a European group that con-
stitutes a "firm," and contemplates whether the uniquely American concept
of "Chinese walls" 68 separates the New York and Paris portions of the
firm. 6 9 Further, if the firm's Berlin office is, under German law, legally
obligated to disclose a client's intention to commit a crime, can it-and
should it-disclose information obtained from the New York office, even
though U.S. law would forbid such disclosure? 70
These pertinent questions invite related questions in the MDP context:
Is there any conceptual distinction between the scenario involving the New
York and Paris branches of such a law firm, which operate under different
ethical regimes, and two branches of an MDP (whether or not within the
same country), one of which-the legal practice branch-operates under
the ethical rules of the legal profession, while the other branch operates
under the rules of a different profession? Just as the Paris and New York
branches of an international law firm operate under different ethical
regimes, would not the same hold true for an MDP? Thus, where the legal
branch of an MDP is situated inside the United States and the non-legal
branch operates from a different country, could not the legal arm treat
every foreign professional (whether lawyer or non-lawyer) as a non-lawyer
for U.S. purposes? This example clarifies the apparent similarity between
67. Terry explains the pre-European Integration policy of the Belgian Bar in the fol-
lowing way:
In 1984, the Brussels Bars created a special status, called the B List, for foreign
lawyers who were not avocats. Among other provisions, the new B List con-
tained "scope of practice" provisions which permitted B List lawyers, including
U.S. lawyers, to practice European Community law. The B List rules also relaxed
the rules prohibiting registered Belgian lawyers from associating with foreign
lawyers, although there still were many restrictions which limited the usefulness
of the "B List." Within five years of the creation of the B List, a number of
American, English, Dutch, German, and Japanese lawyers were employed by, or
had become partners of, Belgian avocat firms. In 1991, the Brussels Bars further
relaxed their ethics rules when they permitted Belgian lawyers acting as partners
at the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Hamilton & Steen, Brussels ... to become
tableau lawyers, provided several conditions were satisfied.
Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of the Hybrid Model for Facilitating Cross-Border Legal Prac-
tice: The Agreement Between the American Bar Association and the Brussels Bar, 21 FORD-
HAM INT'L LJ. 1382, 1405-06 (1998).
68. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "Chinese wall" as a "fictional device used as a
screening procedure which permits an attorney involved in an earlier adverse role to be
screened from other attorneys in the firm so as to prevent disqulification of the entire
law firm ...... BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONUNCIATIONS 240 (6th ed. 1990).
69. See Vagts, supra note 43, at 694.
70. Id.
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the international law firm and MDP scenarios. If the law currently accom-
modates the former scenario, why not the latter, given their similarity?
In response to this line of questioning, which is engendered by the
pervasive liberalization of the rules for lawyer regulation in the EU, MDP
proponents conclude that developments in Europe will necessarily lead to
the pervasive de-proscription of MDP in European jurisdictions. 7 1 In
drawing this conclusion, they make a mental leap from broad generaliza-
tions reflected in the changing EU regulatory terrain to state-specific out-
comes not supported by the details of the EU regulatory regime. The leap
is based on a macro view of a broad trend with little or no examination of
the micro factors reflected in specific legislation, judicial pronouncements
and related developments. The discussion in Part II of this article is to a
considerable extent an elucidation of the EU regulatory terrain, provided in
order to clarify its true nature.
Perhaps in recognition of the potency of questions such as those posed
in the foregoing paragraph, the CCBE (Council of the Bars and Law Socie-
ties of the European Union), which has traditionally opposed MDPs, 7 2 has
undertaken a program of articulating the unifying essence of lawyerhood,
an essence that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. For instance, Article
1 of the CCBE's Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Union
73
(CCLEU) describes the functions and obligations of a lawyer, 74 while the
71. See, e.g., Robert K. Christensen, supra note 61, at 393 (arguing that the twin
influences behind the march toward blanket European acceptance of MDP are that
"international market forces and consumer trends demand the liberalization of regula-
tions on lawyers . . . [and that] Community principles of competition demand the der-
egulation of the legal profession").
72. See Carl Bevernage, Paris Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal Profession,
18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 89, 96 (1999).
73. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002), at http://www.
ccbe.org/doc/En/code2002-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). Although primarily
addressed to the lawyers of eighteen European Union CCBE member bars, the Code's
influence is much wider. The Bars of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Turkey are, for instance, represented at the CCBE
by Observer delegations. See CCBE, What Is the CCBE?, at http://www.ccbe.org/en/
ccbe/ccbe en.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). Additionally, the CCBE enjoys a consulta-
tive status with the Council of Europe. Id. CCBE also maintains a Permanent Delega-
tion to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the EU and the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court. Id. A stated objective of the CCBE is also to represent
the Bars and Law Societies of the European Economic Area (EEA) to other legal organiza-
tions, institutions and bodies such as the Union Internationale des Avocats, the Interna-
tional Bar Association, and the Association Internationale des Jeunes Avocats. Id. The
CCBE maintains close relationships with other international professional legal organiza-
tions such as the American Bar Association (ABA), Japanese Federation of Bar Associa-
tions (JFBA), and others. Id.
74. Article 1.1 provides as follows:
In a society founded on respect for the rule of law the lawyer fulfils a special
role. His duties do not begin and end with the faithful performance of what he
is instructed to do so far as the law permits. A lawyer must serve the interests of
justice as well as those whose rights and liberties he is trusted to assert and
defend and it is his duty not only to plead his client's cause but to be his adviser.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 73. The Code then
lists that a lawyer has legal and moral obligations towards the client, the courts, and
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second paragraph of Article 1.2.2 is particularly apposite, as it emphasizes
the common foundation of ethical rules and the values that animate them,
notwithstanding divergent details.75 To further the goal of uniformity
across jurisdictions, Article 5.1.2 urges lawyers to recognize their counter-
parts in other member states as colleagues. 76 Since the composition of the
EU is malleable, in the sense that nations can join or leave the union
(though the latter has not happened before), one can assume that the basis
for recognizing other lawyers as colleagues exists even before a country
joins the EU, and remains even after that country has left the union. 7 7 If
one accepts this premise as true, then the same rationale behind recogniz-
ing EU lawyers as colleagues would likely accommodate the recognition of
lawyers from other jurisdictions as "colleagues-at-law" -thereby making
the CCBE's initiative on lawyer collegiality one of universal character. 78 It
is clear that the provisions of the CCBE Code relate more to a lawyer's
function as an advocate defending civil liberties and human rights, a desid-
eratum of civilized societies in liberal legal thought, than to his multifari-
ous transactional and quasi-administrative functions, which constitute the
bulk of legal work, especially in the international context.79 Yet, it is in
other authorities before whom the lawyer pleads his client's cause or acts on his behalf;
the legal profession; and the public. Id.
75. Article 1.2.2 provides:
The particular rules of each Bar or Law Society arise from its own traditions.
They are adapted to the organisation [sic] and sphere of activity of the profes-
sion in the Member State concerned and to its judicial and administrative proce-
dures and to its national legislation. It is neither possible nor desirable that they
should be taken out of their context nor that an attempt should be made to give
general application to rules which are inherently incapable of such application.
The particular rules of each Bar and Law Society nevertheless are based on the
same values and in most cases demonstrate a common foundation.
Id. art. 1.2.2.
76. Id. art. 5.1.2.
77. A study by the McCrate Commission determined that among the four values
common to all those in the legal profession are "striving to promote justice, fairness, and
morality" and "striving to improve the profession." Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educa-
tional Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 138-41
(cited in H. Lee Hetherington, Negotiating Lessons from Iran: Synthesizing Langdell &
McCrate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1995)). Collegiality is arguably a necessary goal
inherent in both of these values. Id. However, it could also be true that this "collegial-
ity" is derived from certain transformative processes-such as the comprehensive train-
ing of lawyers upon their countries' accession to the EU treaty.
78. See id.
79. Concerning the latter, Daniel R. Fischel wrote the following:
Lawyers offer services that, in certain areas, duplicate those offered by other
professionals. Lawyers or accountants can offer tax advice; lawyers or invest-
ment bankers can structure defensive tactics in response to a tender offer; law-
yers or financial planners can provide estate planning services; lawyers or other
investigators can marshal facts from corporate employees in response to a regu-
latory investigation.
Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). See also
David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal
Ethics, in 2 EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
Wilkins emphasizes that "[c]orporate lawyers have always provided a complex mix of
business and legal advice to their clients," just as other professionals-notably account-
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relation to a lawyer's substantive, rather than idealistic, functions that most
professionals base their arguments in favor of cooperation with lawyers
through MDPs.
Historical factors conceptually reinforce the perception that the dis-
tinction between non-lawyer professionals and foreign lawyers is small, so
that the de-proscription of MDP should readily result from a general trend
towards liberalization. This is especially true in the accounting field. The
most important players in the global legal and accounting arena are firms
with origins in common law jurisdictions.80 Features specific to common
law jurisdictions were conducive to the growth and expansion of profes-
sional legal and accounting firms in a way that was not readily possible in
civil law countries.8 1 For the legal profession, these features include the
absence of the national-residence requirement and the related single-resi-
dence (unicite de cabinet) requirement, which were respectively at issue in
the ECJ cases of Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid8 2 and Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp.8 3
Important to all professions, however, is the higher level of autonomy from
ants, investment bankers and management consultants-have "stepped up their efforts
to compete with lawyers" in advising multinational corporations concerning their global
operations. Id. at 88. Drawing out the implications of this trend, Wilkins acknowledges
that the mixed advice proffered by practicing lawyers to their clients (even outside the
corporate arena) pragmatically undermines the assumption that law is autonomous in
practice, just as the widely accepted view that "law is at least moderately indeterminate,
and that legal decisions partially rest on contested political, moral, economic, sociologi-
cal, cultural, and psychological assumptions" theoretically undermines the assumption
that law is distinct and autonomous from these influences. Id. at 87.
80. Dutch firms have begun to make inroads into the international arena, given the
relatively liberalized regulatory structure of the Dutch bar vis-a-vis other European bars.
See ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 23-24. However, Dutch firms are unlikely to become as
established or geographically extensive as firms of common law origin. See Abel, supra
note 23, at 795 (pointing out that the Netherlands' small size and the fact that Amster-
dam is "neither a major financial center, like London, Paris, and Frankfurt, nor a
regional capital, like Brussels," impede Dutch firms' expansion into the transnational
market). The WTO Secretariat reports that large law firms are still a phenomenon lim-
ited to a small number of common law countries: "In 1988 the first 91 law firms by
number of partners were from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Aus-
tralia. The top twenty firms included 17 from the United States (including the top
three), two from Canada (4 and 15) and one from the United Kingdom (8)." See WTO
Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/43, c 21 (July
6, 1998). Furthermore, all of the Big 5 accounting firms originated in the United States,
the United Kingdom, or Canada (KPMG also has roots in Amsterdam). See Christine E.
Earley, et al., Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the
Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1013, 1029 (2003) (discuss-
ing the founding of Arthur Andersen); About Ernst & Young, at http://www.big4.com/
big4/B4AboutEY.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2004); About Deloitte & Touche, at http://
vww.big4.com/big4/B4AboutDT.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2004); About KPMG, at
http://www.big4.com/Big4/B4AboutKPMG.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2004); About Price-
waterhouseCoopers, at http://www.big4.com/big4/B4AboutPWC.aspx (last visited Apr.
9, 2004).
81. See Abel, supra note 23, at 741-42.
82. Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-
nijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1975) (Neth.).
83. Case 107/83, Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, 1984 E.C.R.
2971.
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the state in common law jurisdictions than in civil law jurisdictions. 84 It is
thus significant that the nexus between accounting and law in the primal
common law country, England, is a strong one, where accounting is a prog-
eny of the law.85
This historical nexus invites additional questions: If the professions of
law and accounting were once the same (in the sense of one having been
nurtured within the other), does not this suggest the possibility, even the
likelihood, that these professions can interact in the context of MDP?
Could the differences really be so fundamental and insuperable as to be
amenable to no solution? These questions, in turn, invite a reconsidera-
tion of the bases for the fundamental distinction between the two profes-
sions, as articulated by those opposed to MDP. In arguing that the bases
for reuniting the professions are more persuasive than those for retaining
their distinction, MDP proponents conclude that the prospects of coopera-
tive practice within an MDP are significant and that Europe shows that
merging the two is the way forward. However, a detailed examination of
European jurisdictions in Part II below points to a contrary conclusion.
While the foregoing analysis has focused on accountants (who are the
chief propagators of MDP), it clearly extends to other professions that are
potential beneficiaries of a liberalized MDP regime. For if the regime were
to become liberalized for accountants despite the difficult deontological
dilemmas presented by accountancy in the MDP context, the move towards
MDP between the legal profession and other professions, which in compar-
84. Abbott, exploring this difference, refers to the "quasi-free markets characteristic
of Anglo-American Professions." See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 157
(1988).
85. Yves Dezalay captures this nexus when he writes as follows:
Victorian Solicitors wheedled their way into the privacy of the dominant classes
to become their confidants and men of business. But, from the strength of this
position, they practised [sic] a number of professions: from bankers, debt collec-
tors, estate agents or managers, to politicians or lobbyists for the more fortunate.
One could have said that 'beneath the attorney's wig sleeps half a dozen profes-
sionals'.... It is from this point that we need to begin our attempts to under-
stand the ambiguity between lawyers and accountants. The distinction was far
from obvious a hundred years ago. Accountancy was a technique rather than a
profession, and solicitors, for the most part, kept their clients' accounts in order.
Yves Dezalay, Introduction: Professional Competition and the Social Construction of Trans-
national Markets, in PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER 1, 16 (Yves
Dezalay & David Sugarman eds., 1995). This outgrowth of accounting from law, espe-
cially lawyers specializing in receivership, is also noted in ANDREW ABBOTT, supra note
84, at 94, 106 (1988) . One might quarrel with the rather-too-recent period (late nine-
teenth century) in which Dezalay locates the inchoate character of the accounting pro-
fession. Keith M. MacDonald notes for instance that, as a specific occupation, accounts
were prominent in Scotland, and quite a few could be found in the city directories of
Glasgow and Edinburgh in the late eighteenth century. KEITH MAcDONALD, THE SOCIOL-
OGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 191 (1995). However, the first practicing firm of accountants
was founded in 1780 by Josiah Wade, in Bristol, who "built up a practice auditing the
books of merchants in the city." Id. See also DEREK MATTHEWS ET AL., THE PRIESTHOOD OF
INDUSTRY 17-18 (1998) (arguing that through "the latter part of the eighteenth century,
there was a gradual growth in the number of independent firms offering accounting
services [in England and Scotland], often of a basic bookkeeping nature to those unwill-
ing or unable to provide their own").
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ison present relatively attenuated deontological problems, should be even
less constrained.
II. MDP in the European Union
The questions raised in Part 1.B, which flow from the pervasive liberal-
ization of the regime for legal services, have contributed to a feeling in
many quarters that MDP has become a fait accompli in Europe8 6 in the
sense of its being poised to completely usurp the delivery of legal and
related services.8 7 Because there are no legal bases for this conclusion,
except for the fact of the liberalization itself,88 it is imperative to test this
conclusion by exploring the EU regime of lawyer regulation, as well as
related practical and theoretical questions emanating from MDP in the EU
context. Indeed, this analysis is important, not just because of the size and
86. See Donald H. Rivkin, Paris Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal Profes-
sion, 18 DicK. J. INT'L L. 55, 72-73 (1999) (arguing that consequently, "American law-
yers and law firms will be at a serious competitive disadvantage in the global legal
marketplace if the existing rules prohibiting [MDPs] are not repealed or relaxed); Zobair,
supra note 41, at 65.
87. See, e.g.,John H. Matheson & Edward S. Adams, Not "If" but "How": Reflecting on
the ABA Commission's Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1269, 1274, 1300 (2000). The authors state the following:
These larger accounting firms, taking advantage of the pro-MDP regulatory sys-
tem overseas, have significant legal practices throughout Europe, with lawyers
on staff or attached to the accounting firms through some variety of contractual
obligations. In some European markets, these accounting firms are already
among the largest providers of legal services for businesses. And this develop-
ment is not likely to be curbed by the legal profession if it does not alter its
regulation; the GATT treaty, which governs most international trade matters,
claims jurisdiction over these professions through the World Trade Organiza-
tion-an organization historically biased against self-interested regulation.
Id. at 1300. See also ABA, Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the
House of Delegates, 1999 A.B.A. REP. 5 app. C, at C4-C5 & n.8 (discussing MDP develop-
ments outside of the United States); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 7, at 1047 (observing that
change in MDP treatment may come as part of a treaty between the United States and
the European Community); James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of
Core Values: A "Radical" Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal
Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1160 n.3 (2000). This observation implicitly assumes
that through such a treaty, Europe would put pressure on the United States to open its
borders to MDP. For a response to Hazard's suggestion, see Bernard Wolfman, Testi-
mony Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/wolfman4.html (Feb.12, 2000). Wolfman writes as follows: "Much has been made
of the presence of non-lawyer controlled MDPs in Europe. The impression given is that
they are a great success, serving the public interest and with benefit to all." Id. See
generally Martha Neil, Multidisciplinary Growing Pains in Europe, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan.
21, 2000, at 3, LEXIS, Nexis Library (describing MDPs as "[plermitted but still contro-
versial in Europe"); Delos N. Lutton, Remarks to American Bar Association Special Com-
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/lutton.html (Aug. 8,
1999) (stating that one of the phenomena of MDP is its rapid spread in many large,
industrialized advanced societies, such as Germany, France, and Spain. Although many
countries continue to debate about "the legality of some of these moves by consulting
firms, [ ] the growth is real, it persists, and it is affecting clients and their lawyers every
day in a growing number of arenas").
88. A factual basis for such conclusion is, however, often given by reference to the
extensive legal practices of the Big 5 within Europe. See, e.g., Lutton, supra note 87.
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inherent importance of the EU market for legal services, but also because
any success would vindicate MDP as a template for future professional
practice and would pressure other jurisdictions, including the United
States, to acknowledge and accept MDP.
A. The Establishment Directive
The headnote of the EU's Establishment Directive describes its pur-
pose as facilitating "the practice of the profession of lawyer on a perma-
nent basis in a self-employed or salaried capacity in a Member State other
than that in which the professional qualification was obtained."8' 9 It is the
third in a trio of instruments aimed at liberalizing the cross-border practice
of law within the EU. The first is the Services Directive, 90 which vests EU
lawyers with the right to provide legal services to clients situated in
another member state, while maintaining physical residence in their home
state, and to perform lawyerly functions in that host state through tempo-
rary physical presence (visits), acting under their home state's professional
title. 9 1 The second is the Diplomas Directive, 92 which, though not specific
to the legal profession, mandates the mutual recognition of lawyers' qualifi-
cations across jurisdictional boundaries within specified guidelines. It
effectively permits the full integration of a lawyer into the legal profession
of the host state through assessment of the legal training obtained in the
lawyer's home country, supplemented by remedial examinations (i.e., apti-
tude tests) or practical training (i.e., a period of practice) within the host
state to correct for any deficiencies vis-d-vis the home state's training. The
Establishment Directive takes this liberalization even further. Article 10 of
89. Establishment Directive, supra note 44.
90. Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 59. This directive, which facilitates the
effective exercise by lawyers of the freedom to provide services, ostensibly enabled EU
lawyers to provide advice on their home state and community law under their home
state title.
91. Since Article 1 of the directive refers to the "provision of services," the parame-
ters of which are not expressly defined in the directive, the ECJ has had to glean the
details by construction. Relying on the nature of Article 60 of the Treaty of Rome, in the
context of related provisions, the right to provide services through visits to the host state
has been interpreted as being inherently limited in the sense that a foreign lawyer can
only render legal services for a temporary period in the host state if he seeks to be
covered by the treaty provisions on services. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio
dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165. The Lawyers'
Services Directive-as expressly stated in its preamble-does not contemplate a right of
establishment; nor does it contemplate the recognition of home lawyers' qualifications
(diplomas) in the host state. Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 59. Thus, it covers
only temporary visits into the host state as well as the rendition of services into host
state from home state. Id.
92. Diplomas Directive, supra note 59. A second Diplomas Directive, which supple-
mented Directive 89/48 and established a general system for the recognition of profes-
sional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC, was promulgated to
augment the first directive by establishing a system for the recognition of diplomas
obtained after education of between one and three years. See Council Directive 92/51,
1992 O.J. (L 209) 25; ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 85. But this has little relevance to
lawyers, apart from potential indirect effects on the activities of paralegals, court bailiffs,
process servers, and the like. Id. at 85.
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the Establishment Directive enables a lawyer practicing under his home
state's title to apply for full membership in the host state's legal profession
if he has practiced that state's law within its borders for three years.
9 3
Where a lawyer has practiced in the host state for three years, but his prac-
tice has not been in that state's law, the host state's authorities may grant
him full membership if he meets supplementary requirements. 94 The
Directive thus exempts such a lawyer from the examination requirements
of Article 4(1)(b) of the Diplomas Directive, relying instead on practical
experience as a peremptory basis for full integration into the host state's
legal profession. 9
5
As part of the liberalization process, the Establishment Directive
addresses what forms the professional associations involving lawyers can
take. This is necessary to ensure that the regulation of lawyers' groupings
by their home state does not become a means of impeding competition in
the legal services arena through indirect restraints on the forms of profes-
sional associations (groupings) open to lawyers in a host state.96 Several
provisions of the Directive in this regard are noteworthy.9 7 However, of
direct relevance to the MDP question is Article 11.98 This provision autho-
93. The lawyer who did not practice host state law for three years is not automati-
cally exempt from Diplomas Directive 89/48 Article 4(1)(b) requirements, but host state
authorities have discretionary power to grant him admission without his having to meet
these requirements. Establishment Directive, supra note 44, art. 10, at 41.
94. See Establishment Directive, supra note 44, art. 10(3), at 41. This provision pre-
supposes that the three years of practice in the host state has not been in host state law
but rather in international law, or the law of some other member state.
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id. at 41-42.
97. Articles 8, id. at 40, and 12, id. at 42, of the Directive are apposite. Article 8
permits a lawyer practicing in a host state under his home state professional title to do
so as a salaried employee of another lawyer, firm, or other entity. In essence, it permits
such a lawyer to practice as a member of a team of in-house counsel in the form of a
lawyer grouping. Article 12 permits lawyers, practicing in a host state under their home
state professional title, to use in the host state the name of any grouping to which they
belong in their home state.
98. Article 11 reads in part:
Where joint practise [sic] is authorised [sic] in respect of lawyers carrying on
their activities under the relevant professional title in the host Member State, the
following provisions shall apply in respect of lawyers wishing to carry on activi-
ties under that title or registering with the competent authority:
(1) One or more lawyers who belong to the same grouping in their home Mem-
ber State and who practise [sic] under their home-country professional title in a
host Member State may pursue their professional activities in a branch or
agency of their grouping in the host Member State. However, where the funda-
mental rules governing that grouping in the home Member State are incompati-
ble with the fundamental rules laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in the host Member State, the latter rules shall prevail insofar as compli-
ance therewith is justified by the public interest in protecting clients and third
parties.
(5) Notwithstanding points 1 to 4, a host Member State, insofar as it prohibits
lawyers practising [sic] under its own relevant professional title from practising
[sic] the profession of lawyer within a grouping in which some persons are not
members of the profession, may refuse to allow a lawyer registered under his
home-country professional title to practice in its territory in his capacity as a
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rizes the host state to determine what types of legal practice groupings or
structures are permissible in its jurisdiction. This power of the host state
is subject, of course, to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination
between host state and home state lawyers in the application of any rules
regarding permissible practice structures. 99 In this regard, Article 11 ech-
oes paragraph fifteen of the Directive's preamble, recognizing the possibil-
ity that prohibitions against certain forms of practice groupings can be
used as a pretext to prevent or deter home state lawyers from establishing
themselves in a host state, but nevertheless emphasizing the need to allow
member states to "take appropriate measures .with the legitimate aim of
safeguarding the profession's independence."'10 0
Other aspects of Article 11 are also instructive as they indicate the
broader thinking on MDP in EU regulatory framework. One of these facets
is the treatment, on the one hand, of a host state's refusal to permit a form
of home state practice grouping in general, and, on the other hand, its
refusal to permit a home state grouping which qualifies as an MDP. 10 1
Under Article 11(1), lawyers practicing in a host state under their home
state professional title, who belong to the same professional grouping (say,
a law firm) in their home state, may be prohibited from practicing under a
branch or agency of that grouping in the host state if "the fundamental
rules governing that grouping in the home Member State are incompatible
with the fundamental rules.., in the host Member State."'01 2 However, the
member of his grouping. The grouping is deemed to include persons who are
not members of the profession if
-the capital of the grouping is held entirely or partly, or
-the name under which it practises [sic] is used, or
-the decision-making power in that grouping is exercised, defacto or de jure, by
persons who do not have the status of lawyer within the meaning of Article 1(2).
Where the fundamental rules governing a grouping of lawyers in the home
Member State are incompatible with the rules in force in the host Member State
or with the provisions of the first subparagraph, the host Member State may
oppose the opening of a branch or agency within its territory without the restric-
tions laid down in point (1).
Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 41-42. Under Article 1(2) of the Directive,
"home member state" is defined as the member state in which a lawyer acquired the
right to use onc of the recognized professional titles for lawyers (avocat, barrister, recht-
sanwalt, dikigoros, etc.) before practicing the profession of lawyer in another EU member
state. "Host member state" is defined as the member state in which a lawyer practices
(or seeks to practice) pursuant to the Directive. Id.
99. While Article 11(5) is express on the need for non-discrimination, Article 11(1)
is not. It stands to reason, however, that, given the cardinal place of non-discrimination
as an (if not the) organizing principle of the EU and similar economic arrangements,
non-discrimination is nevertheless implicated in the application of Article 11(l) of the
Directive. Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 41.
100. Id. at 38.
101. See Lonbay, supra note 57, at 925-26.
102. Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 41. At least two scenarios are possible
under this provision. One is the possibility that such a practice grouping is generally
banned in the host state-as is the case with the prohibition of partnerships between
English barristers, although barristers are not prohibited from sharing chambers with
one another and may even work on the same matter as another barrister in their cham-
ber, a situation which may operationally resemble a partnership. See Carole Silver, Mod-
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host state's rules preventing lawyers from practicing in a grouping govern
only "insofar as compliance therewith is justified by the public interest in
protecting clients and third parties." 10 3
In essence, a host state's prohibition of an MDP under Article 11(5) is
less constraining because it does not require states to consider the public
interest. 10 4 It requires only that if MDP is prohibited in that jurisdiction,
the prohibition must affect host state lawyers and not just foreign law-
yers.1 0 5 Such language implicitly recognizes that MDPs are beset by
problems so apparent that they need not be positively proven when a host
state's prohibition of MDP is challenged; courts assume that public interest
considerations drive the host state's prohibition. The disparity in legal
protection clearly favors the establishment of branches of law firms or pro-
fessional corporations over MDPs because the host country can only justify
the prohibition of such branches on the public interest grounds of client
and third party protection, thus narrowing the host country's discretion as
compared with the broad discretion afforded in prohibiting MDPs.
Indeed, Article 11(5) effectively puts MDPs at a disadvantage vis-d-vis
non-lawyer entities (e.g., investment banks) established in one EU member
state that seek to offer legal services in a host country through a branch
office. Since such entities are not associated with lawyers, they presuma-
bly do not fall under the Establishment Directive. As such, they would be
governed by more general EU rules relating to services and the right of
establishment. 10 6 Subject to host state rules on the offering of legal ser-
vices by non-lawyers, such entities could offer legal services without com-
ing within the ambit of Article 11(5). The provisions of Article 11 are
aimed at providing host states with the capacity to check the propagation
of MDPs-well beyond what would ordinarily be their capacity under gen-
eral rules of the EU regime-while simultaneously facilitating the propaga-
els of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 37, 85-86 n. 123 (1996) (citingJohn Kendall, Barristers, Independence and Disclo-
sure, 8 ARB. INT'L 287, 288-99 (1992)). Assuming practice in a partnership is allowed to
French avoues, the regulatory authorities of the English legal profession can, as the host
state, validly prohibit a French avoue from practicing in England in partnership with
another avout, the prohibition of partnerships between advocates (whether called barris-
ters or some other name) being a fundamental English rule of professional regulation. A
more intriguing possibility is that an EU country would authorize a particular practice
grouping as to members of the host country's legal profession and other EU lawyers, but
not as to lawyers of another EU country whose legal requirements governing such
groupings are incompatible with those of the host state.
103. Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 41.
104. Id. Article 11(5) of the Establishment Directive provides, in part, that "[wihere
the fundamental rules governing a grouping of lawyers in the home Member State are
incompatible with the rules in force in the host Member State or with the provisions of
the first subparagraph [i.e. contrary to the public interest], the host Member State may
oppose [its] opening .... Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that
"[elvery citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise
the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State." 2000 OJ. (C
364) 1, art. 15(2), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2004).
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tion of other practice groupings that exclusively involve lawyers by giving
the host state less leeway in constraining such practice structures. 10 7 The
policy reasons justifying this dichotomy are not expressed, but the capacity
given host states to constrain the formation of MDPs is consistent with the
EU legislature's acceptance of the potentially pernicious consequences of
MDPs on lawyer ethics, especially on lawyer independence.' 0 8
Also instructive is Article 11(5)'s definition of MDP as a grouping
wherein "the capital ... is held entirely or partly, or the name under which
it practises [sic] is used, or the decision-making power in that grouping is
exercised, de facto or de jure, by persons who do not have the status of
lawyers within the meaning of Article 1(2)" of the Establishment Direc-
tive. 10 9 This definition clearly brings several professional arrangements
that otherwise might not have qualified as MDPs within the reach of the
host state's regulatory authorities. The breadth of this definition evinces
the intent of the EU legislature to provide to the host state a catch-all provi-
sion which can be used in much the same way that the United States Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has used Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934-as a tool for enjoining a wide-rang-
ing and perpetually evolving range of acts and omissions coming under the
loosely defined rubric of insider trading. 10 The similarity is more than a
passing one, for the breadth of the SEC's power, which flows from the gen-
107. The peremptory language of provisions of Article 11(2) and 11(3) of the Estab-
lishment Directive addresses the constraint on host states in relation to practice struc-
tures exclusively involving lawyers:
(2) Each Member State shall afford two or more lawyers from the same grouping
or the same home Member State who practise [sic] in its territory under their
home-country professional titles access to a form of joint practice. If the host
Member State gives its lawyers a choice between several forms of joint practice,
those same forms shall also be made available to the afore-mentioned lawyers.
The manner in which such lawyers practise [sic] jointly in the host Member
State shall be governed by the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
that State.
(3) The host Member State shall take the measures necessary to permit joint
practice also between:
(a) several lawyers from different Member States practising [sic] under their
home-country professional titles;
(b) one or more lawyers covered by point (a) and one or more lawyers from the
host Member State.
The manner in which such lawyers practice jointly in the host Member State
shall be governed by the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of that
State.
Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 42.
108. Implicit in such acceptance is the realization by the EU authorities that lawyer
ethics embody societal values worthy of protection even at the risk of impairing competi-
tion. Infra Part lI.D addresses this issue, discussing the ECJ decision in Case C-309/99,
Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577,
[2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (2002).
109. Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 42.
110. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 459 (1989)
(reviewing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988)) (explaining
that "Section 10(b), even as explicated in SEC Rule 10b-5, is broad and vague, deciding
few cases at the rule-making level, and leaving most cases to be decided in common law
fashion as they arise").
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erality and looseness of that provision's definition of the offense, is evi-
dence of the U.S. legislature's intent to broadly empower the SEC to hunt
down a range of activities about which the legislature was, rightly or
wrongly, very concerned.11 1 Similar to Rule 10b-5, a liberal reading of
Article 11(5) would grant host states a broad power to enjoin a range of
practice groupings (whatever shape they may take or evolve into) under the
EU regime.
Of particular importance in relation to the definitional scope is the
fact that Article 11(5) defers to host states' authority to prohibit de facto
arrangements that give decision-making power in a practice grouping to a
non-lawyer. 1 1 2 Given the modus operandi of international MDP firms,
involving an assortment of ingenious arrangements 1 3 that may not always
possess the full features of de jure control or decision-making power, this
element of the definition is far-reaching. It can, for instance, encompass an
arrangement for the licensing of intellectual property by a firm of informa-
tion technology consultants to an ostensibly independent firm of lawyers,
where the license arrangement ties the consultants' fees to the profitability
of the law firm and as a corollary gives the consultants considerable influ-
ence over the affairs of the law practice; the fees paid under the license
agreement are but a camouflaged remittance of partnership profits. De
facto decision-making power can similarly result from a credit arrangement
under which the lender retains the power, even if residual, to direct or
influence the affairs of the practice grouping. Here, the arrangement may
also be one in which "the capital of the grouping is held entirely or partly"
by a non-lawyer. 1 14 The different elements of the definition may therefore
be seen as mutually reinforcing.
That the definition of MDP also encompasses arrangements in which
non-lawyers are entitled to use the group's name further demonstrates the
considerable leeway that the Establishment Directive gives host states to
111. For a comparative examination and critique of the broad character of U.S.
insider trading norms and their amenability to the control and prosecution of an ever-
evolving range of activities, see generally George C. Nnona, International Insider Trading:
Reassessing the Propriety and Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 185, 186-94 (2001).
112. Establishment Directive, , supra note 44, at 42.
113. See Marc N. Biamonte, Note, Multidisciplinary Practices: Must a Change to Model
Rule 5.4 Apply to All Law Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1161, 1192 (2001). In dis-
cussing law firms' methods to stretch the language of the Model Rules as far as possible
to cover their actions, Biamonte asserts as follows:
Many law firms are branching out into law-related businesses and using Rule
5.7 as a shield. Rule 5.7 allows law firms to operate "law-related services" if the
service is provided in conjunction with, and in substance relates to, the provi-
sion of legal services. Such services have included document management, liti-
gation consultation, technology solutions, investigative work and real estate
services. MDP proponents are pushing the definition of "law related services"
to meet their needs and expand their firms' practices into non-traditional areas.
Id.
114. Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 42.
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enjoin MDPs in their various manifestations. 115 When juxtaposed with
recent developments in the United States in the area of permissible practice
structures, it shows the EU regime as being far more restrictive than com-
mentators indicate. 1 16 Article 11(5) would, for instance, make it legitimate
for a host state to prohibit in its territory establishment of firm branches
involved in ancillary business activities currently permitted to U.S. law
firms under Rule 5.7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 117
Though not MDPs in the sense of a direct partnership between lawyers and
non-lawyers for the provision of legal services (the preoccupation of most
U.S. MDP commentators), they nonetheless implicate the same con-
cerns. 1 18 Thus, Article 11(5) does not distinguish between the two forms
of practice groupings.
115. Id. Article 11(5) states that "[tihe grouping is deemed to include persons who
are not members of the profession if ... the name under which it practises [sic] is used
* . . by persons who do not have the status of lawyer .... Id. Thus, if a member state
decides, for example, that the combined firm name of McKee, Nelson, Ernst & Young
"can be viewed as a misrepresentation as to the relationship of the law firm with the
accounting/consulting firm," Brit McAfee, Whether You Think MDP Stands for Most Dis-
cussed Problem or Most Discussed Potential, Multidisciplinary Practice Should Have Your
Attention, 2 TRANSACTIONS 25, 30 (2001), such a misrepresentation could be actionable
under the Establishment Directive. See also discussion infra notes 119-27 and accompa-
nying text.
116. See, e.g., supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
117. Rule 5.7 permits lawyers to offer law-related non-legal services to clients, either
by themselves or through a separate entity controlled jointly with non-lawyers. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1983). Interestingly, in the latter case, there is no
specification as to the necessity for the separate entity to have a name distinct from that
of the lawyer or law firm. However, the lawyers that form part of that entity must con-
stantly remind clients that they do not practice in their capacity as lawyers when they
offer ancillary business services. Hazard notes that Rule 5.7 is a compromise position
between those who wish to totally prohibit ancillary business activities and those who
felt that ancillary business services were a necessary corollary of law practice, both on
account of the opportunity they present for high-quality integrated services to clients
and on account of the needs of some lawyers-especially solo practitioners-who have
traditionally performed such services as a standard source of income. See HAZARD ET
AL., supra note 7, at 1044.
118. Given the similarity of the issues involved, the debate about the propriety of
permitting ancillary services in the United States was heated before it became sup-
planted in the late 1990s by the new debate on MDP-taking the term MDP to mean a
direct partnership between lawyers and non-awyers for the provision of legal services,
rather than similar arrangements for rendering non-legal services that nevertheless give
non-lawyers de facto control over lawyers. The tone of the ancillary business activities
debate is indicated by the following statement by Fox, an opponent of ancillary business
practices and therefore MDP:
[T]he ancillary business movement introduces non-lawyers into positions of
influence and control of the profession. All the safeguards one can imagine do
not overcome the reality that those who come to prominence and success in the
operations of the ancillary business will end up with real power in the govern-
ance of the overall enterprise. Quite simply, money talks, and dependence on
money changes perspectives in a way that people of the utmost good will cannot
overcome.
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 7, at 1043 (quoting LawrenceJ. Fox, Restraint Is Good in Trade,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 29, 1991, at A17). Those who support ancillary business activities make
arguments similar to those adopted currently by MDP supporters. Hazard refers to the
arguments of such a proponent, James Jones:
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The debate surrounding the formation in 1999 of the law firm of
McKee Nelson Ernst & Young in the United States District of Columbia-
an arrangement involving the international accounting and professional
services firm of Ernst & Young-sheds light on how the provisions of Arti-
cle 11(5) of the Establishment Directive constrain the expansion of MDP
practice groupings within the EU. 119 Professor Wolfman captures the cir-
cumstances surrounding the establishment of McKee Nelson Ernst &
Young:
There has been a great deal of Ballyhoo about the significance, the precedent
making significance, of the affiliation between Ernst & Young and Bill
McKee and Bill Nelson and their colleagues .... Yet the public has no real
idea of the nature of the affiliation. We are told that the firm name, McKee
Nelson Ernst & Young is lawful as a trade name, but that Ernst & Young is
but a financier in the transaction, not a partner or joint venturer. In the
same breath, however, [Ernst & Young] tells us that now they have a firm in
which their clients will be able to receive legal services. Neither the lawyers
nor the accountants have been willing to make public their underlying docu-
ments, even in redacted form with the dollar amounts deleted. The press
releases and interviews have emphasized that E&Y has no equity interest in
the firm, notwithstanding the misleading implication of the firm name to
the contrary. They insist that E&Y has merely financed the start-up, so-
called independent law firm. But they will not divulge the terms of the so-
called "financing." 
120
This affiliation presented members of the bar with the difficulty of
determining how to go beyond the mere concurrence or similarity in the
names of the two firms in ascertaining whether the new law firm was
indeed under the influence and control of the accounting firm.12 1 Presum-
ably, the District of Columbia authorities did not encounter these difficul-
ties since they could request from the law firm any information they
reasonably required in order to ascertain the true workings of this affilia-
[T]he practice of law 'has become far more complex and diverse' than could be
imagined some years ago: the underlying economic and social activity is more
complicated, requiring the tools and knowledge of other disciplines, and the
law's efforts to regulate under these circumstances is infinitely more complex
and requires the skills of specialized lawyers 'working in tandem' with profes-
sionals from other disciplines. This interdisciplinary collaboration, Jones
argues, is best carried on in organizations that give equal status and rewards to
nonlawyer participants.
Id. at 1044.
119. See Wolfman, supra note 88.
120. Id.
121. See id. There was a general belief that the new firm chose the District of Colum-
bia (DC) as its place of establishment because of the relatively relaxed rules of that
jurisdiction on inter-professional associations involving lawyers and non-lawyers. How-
ever, the firm's lack of transparency regarding the details of its financing and relation-
ship with the accounting firm prevented a full evaluation of the permissibility of the
practice structure under the DC rules of professional regulation, given that such partner-
ships, unlike corporations, were not obliged to make mandatory filings that would
enable a third party to discern the details of the financing arrangements and ownership
structure. Id.
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tion. 122 There is always a possibility, however, that the law firm would
hedge and be less than forthcoming, given that the right to form coopera-
tive associations with non-lawyers is not a completely unfettered one under
the District of Columbia version of Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 123 and the requested disclosures could expose the firm to
sanctions in some respects. For instance, the District of Columbia man-
dates that an association restrict itself to the provision of legal services, in
connection with which the non-lawyers' sole function would be to provide
input when legal questions arise that implicate their expertise. 124 How-
ever, uncovering the facts necessary to determine that such an association
has contravened this (or any other) restriction may require District of
Columbia authorities to become embroiled in costly, protracted litigation.
By contrast, in the same circumstances, by relying on the mere resem-
blance between the names of the new law firm and the accounting firm, an
EU host state could legitimately decide to enjoin the association under
Article 11(5).125 Beyond questions bordering on information discovery,
the host state can, upon learning the facts, rely on any evidence of de facto
control as a basis for enjoining the practice grouping. 126 It is not clear that
reliance on such evidence of de facto control is possible under Model Rule
5.4.127
122. Id.
123. DC MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (1991).
124. Id. at 5.4(b)(1).
125. See Establishment Directive, supra note 44, at 42.
126. Id.
127. Wolfman's comments on the McKee Nelson Ernst & Young law firm suggest,
however, that it should be possible to rely on evidence of de facto control, especially
evidence of loans made to the law firm on less-than-commercial terms:
We all know that the law looks behind mere labels to discover the substance of
privately structured arrangements. The label of "debt" has long been penetrated
to see if it is but a cover for equity. McKee and Nelson and their co-author
Whitmire have described the state of the law succinctly and accurately in their
treatise, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners.
An arrangement that lacks economic substance or business reality is a
sham and is not recognized for any tax purposes.
A little later, dealing with a decided case, the book says correctly
Even if an unconditional promise is made to repay an advance at a time
certain or on demand, debt-equity principles may apply to characterize a
'loan' as equity. Thus, an ostensible loan to a partnership without adequate
security or pursuant to noncommercial terms may be characterized as
equity and the lender may be treated as a partner.
The principle of substance-over-form which underlies the McKee-Nelson-Whit-
mire statements in their treatise is not limited to tax cases, and I've not heard
that the doctrine is inapplicable either to Bill McKee or to E&Y, or to any other
lawyers or accountants when it comes to the law and ethics of legal practice.
Surely McKee and E&Y would allow the Commission to examine their constitu-
tive documents, and the Commission should do so. The Commission's job is
not to police, but it is to find out what is happening, and not to base its findings
on speculation or surmise.
Wolfman, supra note 88 (quoting ROBERT L. WHITMIRE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PART-
NERSHIPS AND PARTNERS T1 3.03[3] & 3.03[3][b] (2d. ed. 1993)) (internal citations
omitted).
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The EU formulation of Article 11(5) may have been driven in part by
the Danish experience in the litigation between the Danish Bar Association
and Arthur Andersen over the Andersen-affiliated law firm, Arthur Ander-
sen Advokataktieselskab. 128 The Danish Bar Association argued in its suit
before Copenhagen's Maritime and Commercial Court, among other
things, that the use of the name "Arthur Andersen Advokataktieselskab"
with the addition of the name "Arthur Andersen & Co. SC" on the com-
pany's letterhead decisively showed that the law firm was not indepen-
dent.12 9 The Bar Association thought that the establishment and
subsequent running of the law firm amounted to a circumvention of Sec-
tion 124 of the Administration of Justice Act 1916, a Danish statute which
prohibited the practice of law in partnership with non-lawyers. 130 The
Court, reflecting the views of the Danish Ministry of Justice, indicated that
there was no ground to indict the law firm for an infringement of Section
124.131 Notwithstanding the use of the Arthur Andersen name, the Court
accepted that the firm was a financial entity that was independent of
Arthur Andersen SC and all other participants in the network, including
Arthur Andersen, Chartered Accountants. 132 Even though the firm did not
accept any suggestion that it lacked independence, it did accept that the
use of the firm name may be misleading and subsequently changed the
name. 133 The Danish regulatory authorities could more easily enjoin the
activities of a firm like Arthur Andersen Advokataktieselskab, acting based
on its name only, under the provisions enacted in line with Article 11(5) of
the Directive.
1 3 4
B. Other European Instruments
In addition to the Establishment Directive, other pronouncements of
European institutions are important to facilitate an understanding of how
the European regulatory authorities address the cardinal issues of the legal
128. Advokatraadet v. Arthur Andersen Advokataktieselskab, SH 24 November 1995
(Den.), Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen, 1996.729SH 729-32. The defendant law firm was an
affiliate of Arthur Andersen & Co. SC, a Societe Cooperative incorporated under the
laws of Switzerland with the purpose of administering, coordinating, and developing an
international network between a very large number of undertakings that provide profes-
sional advice. The affiliated undertakings were divided into three groups: auditing and
other consulting business, including tax advice; information technology consulting; and
legal advice. Legal advice was the newest and smallest area. The lawyers who made up
the defendant firm had been before the establishment of the law firm employed by
Arthur Andersen, Chartered Accountants, the accounting and tax consulting affiliate of
the Arthur Andersen & Co. SC, Sociti Cooperative in Denmark. I am grateful to Erik
Kjaer-Hansen of the Danish Bar for information and translation of this case.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Ram6n Mullerat reports that Arthur Andersen eventually discontinued its rela-
tionship with the firm and developed a loose association with a firm of another name,
Advokatfirma R nne Lundgren. Ram6n Mullerat, Report on Multidisciplinary Practices
in Europe, para. VI(8), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mulleratl.html (Apr. 19, 1999).
134. Id.
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profession. The documents discussed in this section indicate the problems
and prospects of MDP in both the EU and the wider European area.
1. Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2000)21
Notable among such instruments is the Recommendation of the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on the Free-
dom of Exercise of the Profession of Lawyer adopted on October 25,
2000.135 The Recommendation reaffirms "the need for a fair system of
administration of justice which guarantees the independence of lawyers in
the discharge of their professional duties without any improper restriction,
influence, inducement, pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason."'136 It goes on to recommend that "the
governments of member states take or reinforce, as the case may be, all
measures they consider necessary with a view to the implementation of the
principles contained in the recommendation."'13 7 The Recommendation
then enunciates six broad principles 138 among which Principle V, gov-
erning lawyers' associations, is particularly germane to the question of
MDP. It provides in part as follows:
1. Lawyers should be allowed and encouraged to form and join profes-
sional local, national and international associations which, either alone or
with other bodies, have the task of strengthening professional standards and
safeguarding the independence and interests of lawyers.
2. Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations should be
self-governing bodies, independent of the authorities and the public.
135. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2000)21 of
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on the Freedom
of Exercise of the Profession of Lawyer [hereinafter the Recommendation], at http://
cm.coe.int/ta/rec/2000/2000r21.htm (Oct. 25, 2000).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Principle I describes general principles on the freedom to exercise the profession
of lawyer; Principle II addresses legal education, training, and entry into the legal profes-
sion; Principle III describes the role and duty of lawyers; Principle IV affirms that all
persons have the right of access to a lawyer; Principle V governs lawyers' associations;
and Principle VI covers disciplinary proceedings. Id. The first two paragraphs of Princi-
ple I emphasize the need for lawyers to be free of interference from the authorities or the
public in the exercise of their profession, and that access to the profession should be
controlled by independent professional authorities. Id. Principle Ill, in paragraphs one
and two, recommends that (1) "[b]ar associations or other lawyers' professional associa-
tions should draw up professional standards and codes of conduct and should ensure
that, in defending the legitimate rights and interests of their clients, lawyers have a duty
to act independently, diligently and fairly"; and (2) "[p]rofessional secrecy should be
respected by lawyers in accordance with internal laws, regulations and professional
standards. Any violation of this secrecy, without the consent of the client, should be
subject to appropriate sanctions." Id. Other aspects of the Recommendation emphasize
the need for lawyers to avoid conflicts of interest, take up pro bono work, and respect
several of the incidences of legal practice that have traditionally constituted animating
norms of the legal profession. Id. Overall, the Recommendation clearly reaffirms the
traditional values that have animated the legal profession in liberal Western societies-
especially professional independence of lawyers in its various ramifications as a funda-
mental requirement of a free society under the rule of law.
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3. The role of Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations
in protecting their members and in defending their independence against
any improper restrictions or infringements should be respected.
4. Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations should be
encouraged to ensure the independence of lawyers .... 139
These provisions, which emphasize the independence and protection
of lawyers, are relevant to the MDP debate because many MDP proponents
assume, implicitly or expressly, that lawyer independence is either unnec-
essary or not sufficiently fundamental to merit protection from the poten-
tial impact of professional groupings, even where stresses inherent in MDPs
place that independence at risk.140 Beyond the criticism of independence
in the context of MDP is a broader skepticism in U.S. academic commen-
tary concerning the value of independence and the need for its mainte-
nance at relatively strict levels. 14 1 By contrast, the Recommendation is
indicative of contrary thinking in influential European circles. The Recom-
mendation places lawyers' independence at the forefront of social values
and, in so doing, departs from the position held in U.S. academic circles.
It effectively places a major obstacle on arguments that predicate the emer-
gence and acceptance of MDP on the needlessness or amenability to com-
promise of lawyer independence. Such arguments are unsustainable in the
European context, thus creating a less conducive atmosphere for the propa-
gation of MDPs than many MDP proponents assume. The cross-cutting
and broad membership of the Council of Europe, as well as its established
track record in articulating and championing social values and human
139. Id.
140. The form and nuances of this depreciation of the importance of lawyer indepen-
dence are quite variegated. Some MDP proponents emphasize that the benefits flowing
from MDP outweigh the costs of reduced independence or compromised confidentiality
for lawyers, confidentiality itself arguably being an indicator of lawyers' independence
from authorities and persons from whom they may otherwise withhold information.
See generally Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in
Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1216-19 (2000) (arguing generally that
the attenuated client loyalty, confidentiality, and attorney-client privilege requirements
for lawyer-accountant MDPs would bode well for corporate clients by making the corpo-
ration's lawyers better able to challenge the inside managers and "disrupt" internal mis-
conduct by them). See also Kostant, Paradigm Regained, supra note 18, at 44-47. Other
MDP proponents, while tacitly accepting values such as confidentiality and the avoid-
ance of conflicts of interest, refuse or fail to recognize the link between these principles
and the broader principle of independence of lawyers. It follows from this thinking that
the principle of professional independence, even if accepted, should not compel the "iso-
lation" of lawyers from other professionals, a practice that is neither universal nor funda-
mental. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1116-18 (2000). A strand of the argument here appears to be that
the core values are not threatened by practice groupings like MDP that involve lawyers
and non-lawyers in joint practice. Id. at 1144-45.
141. For a questioning of the value of lawyer independence from regulatory oversight
by authorities other than bar associations and a discussion of the various bodies that
could exercise regulatory power and effective control over lawyers, see David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 H~av. L. REV. 799, 812-14, 853-73 (1992). See
generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988)
(challenging some aspects of lawyer independence, while reinforcing others).
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rights in the wider European area, makes its position on lawyer indepen-
dence a very influential one, perhaps even more influential than the posi-
tion of the EU itself.
14 2
2. Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union's Code
and Resolutions
The Commission Consultative des Barreaux de la Communaute
Europene (CCBE), as the consultative organization of the bar organiza-
tions of the European Union and other European states, is quite influential
in European legal circles, maintaining consultative status at the Council of
Europe and analogous relationships with other European institutions,
including the European Court of Justice. 1 43 The CCBE "strongly opposes
the concept of multi-disciplinary partnerships"144 -an opposition that has
been manifest in its initiatives over the years. One of the initiatives is the
Declaration on Multidisciplinary Partnerships unanimously adopted in ple-
nary session in Brussels on November 26, 1993.145 On November 12,
1999, the CCBE met in plenary session in Athens and produced a report
that further reinforced its opposition to MDPs. Reiterating the value of law-
yer independence and the relevance of the core values that support such
independence, including the principle of confidentiality and the rule
against conflict of interests (values incompatible with the realities of MDP,
especially in connection with accountants), the CCBE concluded as
follows:
[I]n the jurisdictions with which it is familiar, the problems inherent to inte-
grated co-operation between lawyers and non-lawyers with substantially dif-
fering professional duties and correspondingly different rules of conduct,
present obstacles which cannot be adequately overcome in such a manner
that the essential conditions for lawyer independence and client confidenti-
ality are sufficiently safeguarded, and that inroads upon both, as a result of
exposure to conflicting interests served within the relevant organization, are
adequately avoided.
142. Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe had 41 members as of April 1999,
cutting across countries of Eastern and Western Europe and extending as far east as
Turkey. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 789 (2d ed. 2000). Its object is "to promote democracy, the rule
of law and greater unity among the nations of Western Europe." Id. It has initiated and
promulgated several highly influential international instruments, including the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
1950. Id. at 786-87.
143. For institutional affiliations of the CCBE and the multi-state reach of its activi-
ties, see supra text accompanying note 73.
144. See Bevernage, supra note 73, at 96.
145. See Mullerat, supra note 133. See also Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or
Entrepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in
the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of
Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 589, 622 (2002) (stating that CCBE adopted two
declarations in 1993 and 1996 strongly opposing MDPs). "A majority of the Member
State delegations endorsed a resolution in 1998 that would have softened the tone of the
opposition, but that resolution fell short of the required supermajority vote." Id.
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The legal profession is a crucial and indispensable element in the adminis-
tration of justice and in the protection available to citizens under the law.
Safeguarding the efficacy and integrity of this factor within a democratic
society, is a matter of the highest concern and priority. It is part of CCBE's
mission to ensure, that both are given their due.
CCBE consequently advises that there are overriding reasons for not permit-
ting forms of integrated co-operation between lawyers and non-lawyers with
relevantly different professional duties and correspondingly different rules
of conduct. In those countries where such forms of co-operation are permit-
ted, lawyer independence, client confidentiality and disciplinary supervi-
sion of conflicts-of-interests rules must be safeguarded.
146
Beyond such resolutions, the CCBE's Code of Conduct for Lawyers in
the European Union 147 contains several provisions that reiterate CCBE's
opposition on MDPs in Europe. Article 3.6 ("Fee Sharing with Non-Law-
yers") provides that "a lawyer may not share his fees with a person who is
not a lawyer except where an association between the lawyer and the other
person is permitted by the laws of the Member State to which the lawyer
belongs."'148 Although this provision, like many provisions of the CCBE
Code, is semi-peremptory in the sense that it does not have a definite prohi-
bition of fee-sharing arrangements with non-lawyers, it nevertheless rein-
forces the overall CCBE position as articulated more expressly in its
plenary resolution opposing MDPs and is in tandem with the provisions of
the Establishment Directive, effectively leaving to each jurisdiction the pre-
rogative of regulating MDPs. By examining other provisions of the Code,
such as lawyer independence and client confidentiality, CCBE's position
on MDP becomes clear. Article 2.1.1 emphasizes that "[tihe many duties to
which a lawyer is subject require his absolute independence, free from all
other influence, especially such as may arise from his personal interests or
external pressure" 149 irrespective of whether the context is litigation or non-
litigation services. Article 2.3 speaks of confidentiality as being the
essence of a lawyer's function and enjoins a lawyer to "require his associ-
ates and staff and anyone engaged by him in the course of providing pro-
fessional services to observe the same obligation of confidentiality."' 5 0
These two peremptory provisions clearly stand as impediments to the for-
mation of MDPs.
3. Resolutions of the Federation of European Bars (La Federation des
Barreaux d'Europe)
On May 23, 1992, the Federation of European Bars (FBE) was founded
in Barcelona and opened its membership to all bars established in member
146. CCBE, POSITION OF CCBE ON INTEGRATED FORMS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN LAW-
YERS AND PERSONS OUTSIDE THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3-4, at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/
mdpuk.pdf (Nov. 12, 1999).
147. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 73.
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. art. 2.3.4.
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states of the Council of Europe. 151 FBE succeeded the Conference of Prin-
cipal Bars of Europe, established on June 27, 1986, in Paris, by the Bars of
Amsterdam, Barcelona, Brussels, Geneva, Milan, Paris, Frankfurt, and the
Order of Portuguese Lawyers, joined a little later by the Bar of Krakow.15 2
"Bars eligible for membership of the Federation are national, regional or
local Bars depending on the organization of the legal profession in each
member state of the Council of Europe. ' ' 15 3 The major distinction between
the FBE and the CCBE is that the former focuses on and accepts as mem-
bers local bars, e.g., the bars of cities and other domestic sub-divisions
within countries. Apparently not as internationally conspicuous as the
CCBE, its activities nevertheless elicit some attention, especially in view of
the grassroot character of its membership.
On May 3, 1997, in Berlin, the FBE's General Assembly passed a reso-
lution on multidisciplinary partnerships.15 4 While the resolution exhibits
some ambivalence on combinations between lawyers and non-lawyers,' 5 5
it does sufficiently indicate the Federation's opposition to MDP. Paragraph
four of the resolution stipulates the following: "In accordance with the
CCBE decision on 26th November 1993 multi-disciplinary partnerships
between lawyers and non-lawyers with the exception of specific legislation
taking account of the plurality of function of the lawyer and the notary,
should not be permitted."15 6 Apart from the intrinsic importance of the
declared opposition to MDP, this resolution reinforces the CCBE's opposi-
tion by expressly acknowledging it and relying thereon.
C. Operation of MDP in Specific European Jurisdictions
It may be argued that by claiming that MDP has become established in
Europe some commentators on MDP merely emphasize the de facto posi-
tion within some European jurisdictions, rather than the largely de jure
inter-European position, which has been the focus of this Article. Such
emphasis on country-specific de facto positions is strictly speaking imma-
terial, given that the operation of an MDP in disregard of the rules of law
operating within a jurisdiction is not, and should not be, a legitimate, nor-
matively acceptable basis for articulating the existence of a right to do so or
the general position of the law on the subject. It is conceivable that the law
151. THE FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN BARS, STATUTES OF THE EUROPEAN BARS FEDERATION
art. I, at http://www.fbe.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
152. Id.
153. Id. art. V. "A Bar in a state which is not a member of the Council of Europe can
be admitted as an observer if it declares that it acknowledges and will observe the prin-
ciples set out in the[ ] statutes" of the FBE. Id.
154. See Mullerat, supra note 133, para. IV(2).
155. Paragraph three of the resolution provides that "the exercise in one location of
the profession of lawyer and other professions if it is permitted should be accompanied
by precautions to avoid all confusion and to respect the fondamental [sic) professional
ethic of the lawyers['] profession[,J particularly independence, professional secrecy
(privilege) and conflict of interest." E-mail from Nathalie Campagnet-Karsch to the
author (July 16, 2002) (on file with author). See also Mullerat, supra note 133, para.
IV(1)-(2).
156. See e-mail from Nathalie Campagnet-Karsch to the author, supra note 155.
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would become strictly enforced in the future and the offending activities
effectively checked, thereby bringing the de facto position in line with the
legal position.'5 7 However, it is a fact that the legal position within some
specific European countries is permissive of MDPs, and to the extent that
such de jure permission (or even tolerance) of MDP is the emphasis in the
claims made for MDP in Europe, such claims have substance. For instance,
Germany, France, and Spain are jurisdictions in which MDPs have received
some legal recognition, albeit in situations contextually and historically far
removed from the U.S. situation because of differences between the com-
mon law and civil law traditions in their conceptualization of the role of
professions. England, on the other hand, with jurisprudence closer to that
of the United States, is a jurisdiction where a lot of deliberation has taken
157. De-emphasizing the implications and importance of the de facto situation in
these countries may be criticized as being formalistic, in the sense of ignoring some of
the non-legal material out of which the law on MDP would ultimately grow. This line of
reasoning, if accepted, necessarily invites a factual inquiry: To what extent have MDPs
sprung up in specific European jurisdictions? What percentage or portion of the market
for legal services is served by MDPs? What is the degree of demand for legal services
offered by MDPs? These questions in turn invite answers to difficult, if not impossible,
definitional and statistical questions, which are not uniform. For instance, how to
define "legal services" for determining the existence of demand for legal services offered
by MDPs? Does MDP include only the fully integrated MDP or does it include interme-
diate forms other than the fully integrated MDP? ABA's MDP Commission has noted
these difficulties in its work. The Commission, after a period of speculation about the
demand for MDP services within the United States, ultimately sought through the Amer-
ican Bar Foundation the assistance of expert economists in quantifying demand for
MDPs that provide legal services. See Annual Report, supra note 5, at 192. This proved
futile, however, as none of the contacted top economists thought it feasible to compute
the demand for MDP legal services in the present circumstances. Id. The Institute for
Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan similarly advised the Commission
on the related question of whether changes to the legal profession's ethics, permitting
MDPs, would "further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer
independence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients." Id. The ISR
replied "that 'public interest,' 'independence,' 'loyalty,' or 'conflict of interest' were, as a
practical matter, incapable of definition in a manner that was independent of percep-
tion." Id. These efforts by the ABA Commission point to the inherent indeterminacy of
broad social facts under consideration.
Laurel Terry, examining the nuts and bolts of German MDPs, similarly bemoaned the
lack of reliable data on MDPs in Germany, concluding that his studies did not "'prove'
the acceptability or unacceptability of MDPs" in Germany. See Terry, supra note 40, at
1569-71, 1609-11. This is notwithstanding that Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO)
Section 59a approved MDP in Germany. Id. at 1561 & n.65. For conflicting surveys
quantifying demand or desire for MDP services in England, see Michael Chambers &
Richard Parnham, Accountants in the Legal Market: Has the Strategy Failed?, COM. LAw.
(London), June 21, 1998, at 40. The survey indicated that out of the 350 largest British
corporations, surveying heads of legal departments (95 responded) and finance direc-
tors (34 responded), 88% of lawyers (84 persons) and 85% of the finance directors (29
persons) opposed MDPs that render legal services. Id. at 40, 43. The Financial Times
backed a survey of one hundred senior executives at U.S. and UK financial institutions.
See Jim Kelly, Long Arm of the Law, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 9, 1999, at 29. The survey
indicated that even though two-thirds of the interviewed executives "preferred buying
legal services in the traditional way ... through a law firm," more than fifty percent of
them indicated that they would be willing to accept a firm that combined lawyers and
accountants. Id. Among U.S. financial companies this figure was seventy-five percent.
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place over the MDP question, but the fundamental restrictions remain in
place. This needs, however, to be distinguished from an assertion that the
supranational norms of the EU or any other international organization
constrain the specific countries in their decision on whether to permit or
prohibit MDPs, an assertion unsupported by EU legislation or
jurisprudence.
Since 1994, Germany explicitly recognized MDP as a permissible
practice structure in the governing legislation: Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung
(BRAO), i.e., Federal Lawyers Act, section 59a. 15 3 The legislation permits
MDPs of certain regulated professions such as tax consultants, patent law-
yers, and accountants.15 9 At least since 1968, such practice structures had
been permitted by virtue of judicial pronouncement by the German
courts.160 Because of its relatively long-standing recognition in Germany,
the MDP scene in that country seems quite settled. It is instructive,
though, that the professions involved were to some extent regarded as dif-
ferent branches of the legal profession, which in Germany (as in many
other civil law countries) is variegated, with different branches performing
functions that are integrated under a single profession in the U.S.
system. 161
France formally permitted MDP after a March 14, 1998 decision of the
National Bar Council, which allowed collaboration only between lawyers
and members of other regulated professions. 16 2 The immediate result of
such recognition was the fractionalization of the French legal profession
into several branches and the repeated attempts of the French government
to forge a strong unified legal profession. Such a unified profession, it was
felt, would be better situated to compete with foreign law firms in the
French and global marketplaces and, perhaps more importantly, would act
as a bulwark against the steady erosion of French legal values by U.S. and
British law firms who have a considerable presence in France. 163 One of
the moves toward such a unified profession was the creation in 1971 of the
conseil juridique, as part of the 1970 reform of a regulated profession. 164
The conseil juridique could not practice before the Court and his activities
were restricted to advisory work on legal aspects of business and related
158. Terry, supra note 40, at 1561.
159. Id. at 1561-62.
160. See id. at 1560-61 (discussing German cases that addressed the MDP issue).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
162. See MacCrate Report, supra note 54, at 208.
163. See id. at 209-10. Exp!oiting these sentiments, Juri-Avenir, the professional asso-
ciation of the Big 5 in France, called MDPs "the most efficient vehicle for the develop-
ment of French law internationally, designed 'to reinforce the status of French Business
Law against the threat of Common law hegemony."' Id. at 209 n.64. The report further
stated that "[iut is the American and British firms established in France rather than the
Big 151 that promote the Anglo-Saxon legal system in France." Id. at 209-10 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Paradoxically, the Big 5 are purveyors of common law tradi-
tions, given that most of them originated from the UK and United States, apart from
currently extensively practicing in these jurisdictions.
164. Id. at 195.
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transactions.' 6 5 A subsequent 1990 reform unified the conseils juridiques
with the avocats into a single profession of avocats. 16 6 This, however, impli-
cated difficult issues of MDP because many of the conseils juridiques were
members of the "Big 5" multinational professional service firms and their
integration into the avocat profession, while they were still members of the
Big 5, meant that the 1990 reform implicitly sanctioned MDPs. Indeed,
some accountants counted themselves among the former conseils juridique.
The resultant arguments and debate pressured regulatory authorities and
led to the National Bar Council's (Conseil National des Barreaux) formal
recognition of MDP in France in 1998.167
The terrain, however, remains murky in some respects. For instance,
the requirement that lawyers in an MDP use a firm name different from
that of the non-lawyer firm with which they are associated means that
France does not permit fully integrated MDP. Furthermore, the extent of
the French bar authorities' power in regulating MDPs involving other pro-
fessions is not clear. Thus, the Juri-Avenir, the professional association of
the Big 5 in France, 168 had contended that "the [French] National Bar
Council does not have the jurisdiction to monitor or control any internal
MDP agreement or regulation relating to rules of ethics and professional
responsibility," and that these are within the jurisdiction of local bar
associations. 169 If correct, this implies that the Council rules relating to
MDP operation, such as the avoidance of certain names or conflicts of
interest, are without effect, leaving local bars (like the bar of Nanterre
(Hauts-de-Seine), seventy percent of whose membership consists of lawyers
associated with the Big 5) with authority over these salient issues. These
factors perhaps account for the abiding uncertainty as to whether MDPs in
France operate de facto or de jure. 1 70
165. See id. at 194-96. Before 1970, ConseilsJuridiques (Conseilsjuridiques etfiducia-
ries-i.e., legal and tax consultants) had existed as a new, unofficial profession. Id. at
194. As such, until the 1970 reform, the title was not protected. Id. at 195. Conseils
juridiques covered the areas of transactional practice that had been neglected by the more
traditional branch of the legal profession, the avocats, who focused on litigation to the
exclusion of business advisory services. See id. Such advisory work was not considered
an aspect of legal practice, so that non-lawyers (which technically included the foreign
lawyers and law firms in France) could practice in that area. Id. at 195-96. Following
the 1970 reform, the conseil juridique became a protected title by virtue of Law 71-1130
of December 31, 1971. Id. at 195 & n.20.
166. Id. at 198. All persons who were conseils juridiques as of December 31, 1991
became avocats by operation of law on January 1, 1992. Id.
167. Id. at 208. "By its decision of March 14, 1998, the National Bar Council offi-
cially allowed all avocats to form associations and partnerships with members of other
regulated professions including accountants and auditors," thus officially recognizing
MDPs in France. Id. at 208. A major aspect of the decision was the requirement of a
distinct firm name. Id. In its decision of March 1999, the French National Bar Council
affirmed the 1998 decision permitting MDPs, which required that "lawyers in an MDP
... use a firm name distinct from the name of the MDP." Id. at 204. Fidal, the legal
practice affiliate of KPMG in France, has reportedly challenged this decision in the
courts. Id. at 203-04.
168. Id. at 209.
169. Id. at 210.
170. See ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 157.
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In the wake of the 1998 decision of the National Bar Council, the
French Prime Minister commissioned the Nallet Report,1 7 1 the purpose of
which was to study how France could reconcile legal ethics considerations
with the demands of MDP as a union of several professions providing legal
and other services.' 7 2 The report notes the presence of the Big 5 in the
French legal market through their control of substantial law practices.'
73
It states that prohibiting MDPs in France is out of the question and makes
recommendations for their regulation. 1 74 Salient aspects of the recommen-
dations include the creation of a national commission having jurisdiction
over matters of professional ethics with authority "to prescribe ethical rules
where there were conflicts or gaps in the rules [ ], and to resolve particular
ethical cases where existing disciplinary bodies lacked jurisdiction."' 175
The report also recommends improvements in the financing of law firms
through the introduction of passive investments to better enable French
firms to obtain the means and attain the size necessary to compete
internationally. 176
With regard to Spain, it has been asserted that "although there are in
theory bans on MDPs, they seem to exist de facto."'17 7 This underscored
the fact that MDP was neither expressly permitted nor prohibited in Spain
under the General Statute for Lawyers (Estatuto General de la Abogacia
Espanola) of 1982,178 as amended. A 2001 review of this legislation 179
embodies provisions for MDP. Article 29 of the revised legislation allows
lawyers to form MDPs with members of liberal professions that are compat-
ible with the practice of law.180
171. The Nallet Report was named after Henri Nallet, the French legislator and ex-
justice minister responsible for the report. See MacCrate Report, supra note 54, at 192.
172. Id. at 211-12.
173. Id. at 192-93, 212.
174. Id. at 212.
175. Id.
176. See id. MacCrate Report, supra note 54, at 214-15; see also Sydney M. Cone, III
& Franqois Berbinau, The Nallet Report and Multidisciplinary Practice, at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/nallet.html (Sept. 30, 1999). A summary of the Nallet report was
prepared for the Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice organized by New York Law
School's Center for International Law held on October 25, 1999 in New York. See Sym-
posium, Multidisciplinary Practice, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 153, 190 (2000).
177. See ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 156. See generally Mullerat, supra note 133, para.
VI(3).
178. Estatuto General de la Abogacia Espanola, R.C.L., 1982, 2294 y 2656. The
Royal Decree 2090 of July 24, 1982 approved the first General Statute for Lawyers. See
Mullerat, supra note 133, para. IV(3). I am grateful to Farina Rabbi of Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, New York, and Maria Isabel Kopcke Tinture of the Spanish Bar, Barce-
lona, for translation of Spanish materials.
179. See Real Decreto 658/2001, de 22 de junio por el que se aprueba el Estatuto
General de la Abogacia Espano-la, B.O.E., 2001, 164, available at http://www2.cgae.es/
es/cgae/docftp/egae.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004); see also Ram6n Mullerat, Multidis-
ciplinary Practices and the Public Interest: Is There a Possible Solution?, 15 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. LJ. 31, 35-36 (2001) (discussing proposed amendments to Spanish General Stat-
ute for Lawyers).
180. Estatuto General de la Abogacia Espano-la, supra note 178, art. 29.
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In addition to the above legislation, the General Council of the Span-
ish Lawyers (Consejo General de la Abogacfa Espaiola) approved on June 30,
2002 the Ethical Code of the Spanish Legal Profession, the C6digo Deonto-
l6gico.18 1 The Ethical Code has no force of law but contains behavioral
guidelines that nevertheless can be important in internal disciplinary mat-
ters. 18 2 Articles 2 and 6 of the Ethical Code stipulate lawyer independence
from external influence and institute firm-wide imputation for disabilities
(incompatibilities) affecting members of the bar.18 3 The exhortation to
independence may be taken as a censure of MDP, at least in some of its
forms.
In the United Kingdom, the legal profession is functionally split
between barristers and advocates, on the one hand, and solicitors on the
other, as well as geographically between England and Wales, Scotland, and
Northern Ireland. 18 4 The profession, except for solicitors in England and
Wales,18 5 disfavors MDP, supporting the position of CCBE on the issue. 186
It is, however, the solicitors in England and Wales who currently constitute
the most numerical and, perhaps, most influential branch of the legal pro-
fession,18 7 though they have historically occupied a lower position than the
barristers in terms of prestige and social influence.
Notwithstanding apparent support from English solicitors and ostensi-
ble leeway in that regard in § 66 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of
1990,188 the current position in England is that MDPs are prohibited,
whether involving barristers or solicitors. 18 9 While partnerships between
solicitors have been permitted, the Solicitors' Practice Rules 1990 have pro-
hibited such association between solicitors and barristers or any other pro-
fession. 190 However, the Law Society of England and Wales (the umbrella
181. CODIGo DEONTOLOGICO (2002), at http://www2.cgae.es/es/cgae/docftp/cod-
deo.PDF (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
182. See id.
183. Id. at 9, 11.
184. MacCrate Report, supra note 54, at 216.
185. Id.
186. Neil Rose, European Lawyers Vote for MDP Ban, L. Soc'Y GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1999,
at 1.
187. MacCrate Report, supra note 54, at 216; see also ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 27.
188. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 66 (Eng.).
189. Section 66 repealed the prior Act prohibiting solicitors from entering into part-
nership with non-solicitors, but left the Law Society with the discretion to prohibit such
partnerships. Id. § 66 (2). It similarly declared that no common law rules prevent bar-
risters from forming unincorporated associations with non-barristers, but left the Gen-
eral Council of the Bar with the discretion to prohibit such association. Id. § 66 (5)(6).
Both the Law Society and the General Council of the Bar retain such prohibitions. Rule
205 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales prohibits practicing barris-
ters from supplying services through and on behalf of any person, except under the
limited exceptions for employed barristers under Rule 502. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE
BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES R. 205 (7th ed. 2000). Rule 7 of the Solicitors' Practice
Rules 1990 similarly prohibits fee-sharing and partnerships with non-lawyers. See THE
LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS 22 (Nicola Taylor
et al. eds., 8th ed. 1999).
190. See ALLISON CRAWLEY, THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, WRITrEN
REMARKS TO THE ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE para. 4 (1999), at
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organization of solicitors with statutory regulatory powers) 19 1 has, since at
least 1999, examined the need for a relaxation of the Practice Rules against
MDP.19 2 It has done so partly out of self-interest in expanding solicitors'
opportunities for business development and partly out of apprehension
that antitrust regulators may view the prohibition of MDP as being
anticompetitive and move against the rules directly, thus denying the Soci-
ety of a meaningful role in shaping the rules for MDP. 193 Because of this,
and because of the existence of law practices sponsored by the Big 5 in
England, one may think that England and Wales have formally permitted
MDPs. This is, however, not the case. Indeed, the most recent thinking
within the bar regulatory circles indicates that, notwithstanding the Law
Society's stated policy that solicitors should be able to practice within
MDPs, such practice would require the government to introduce legisla-
tion, which is not likely to happen in the near future.'
9 4
The Big 5 can legitimately offer legal services to the public in England
and Wales, given that the legal profession in these jurisdictions never
enjoyed a monopoly over legal services, except for court advocacy and the
preparation of conveyance and probate documents. 195 Solicitors merely
had a monopoly of their professional titles. 19 6 Thus, non-lawyers (includ-
ing accountants) may validly render legal services not connected with liti-
gation, if they do not represent themselves to the public as being solicitors
or barristers.197
The Big 5 did not follow this approach in penetrating the legal market
because identifying themselves as employers of non-lawyers wishing to
offer legal services would present them in an unfavorable public light.
Instead, the Big 5 have sought to sponsor and associate themselves with
"independent" firms of solicitors under varying arrangements, the full
details of which are sometimes undisclosed to the public. 198 The best
known firms associated with the Big 5 in England include Garrett & Co.
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/crawley.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). Recent liberaliza-
tion of the regime for lawyer regulation has led to an odd situation where solicitors can
form partnerships with foreign lawyers from other EU countries (who, strictly speaking,
were originally non-lawyers under the law in England and Wales) but may not do so
with English barristers. See id.; see also ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 28. Barristers under
rules 403.1 and 1001 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales are in a
similar situation-they may form partnerships with non-English lawyers but not with
English solicitors. See CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note
189, R. 403.1, 1001.
191. CRAWLEY, supra note 190, para. 3.5.
192. See MacCrate Report, supra note 54, at 218-21.
193. See CRAWLEY, supra note 190, para. 6.
194. See Correspondence from Nicola Taylor, Policy Executive, Professional Ethics
Division of the Law Society, to the author (July 26, 2002) (on file with author).
195. See CRAWLEY, supra note 190, para. 2.1-2.3.
196. Id. para. 2.1.
197. See ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 28; see also CRAWLEY, supra note 190, para. 2.
198. Dzienkowski and Peroni note that in the United Kingdom, while lawyers may not
partner or share legal fees with a non-legal entity, deregulation in the 1980s facilitated
the formation of alliances between solicitor groups and accounting firms. Dzienkowski
& Peroni, supra note 16, at 115-16. Accounting firms have taken advantage of the liber-
alization trend:
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(part of the former Arthur Andersen legal network), KLegal (associated
with KPMG), and Arnheim, Tite & Lewis (associated with
PricewaterhouseCoopers). 199
The Netherlands is the only country in civil law Europe with a culture
of large international law firms of sufficient size and strength to compete
with U.S. and British law firms. 20 0 Under the current regulations, the
Netherlands allows MDP between lawyers and professions recognized by
the General Council of the Bar.20 1 To date, only two such professions have
been approved: civil law notaries and tax consultants. The Council's
refusal to recognize accountants for this purpose spawned the ECJ litiga-
tion in the Wouters case discussed in Part II.D of this Article. 20 2
The table below gives a snapshot of the situation in many other coun-
tries of Western Europe.
MDP
COUNTRY STATUS GOVERNING LAW REMARKS
Austria Prohibited Section 21g of the Rechtsanwalt- Minor exceptions
sordnung as amended on 5/1/ exist for succession
2002.203 to a lawyer's interest
in a firm by family
members and for
retention of such
interest by former
lawyers.
Belgium Prohibited Article 8 of the National Bar The National Bar
Association Regulation of Sep- Association (Nation-
tember 1, 1990 on the exercise ale Orde van Advo-
of the profession of advocate in caten! Ordre National
partnership made pursuant to des Avocats) has
powers granted by Article 496 ceased to exist. Its
[A]ccounting firms have initiated the creation of "captive" law firms that serve
the clients of the accounting firms exclusively. Recently, however, there has
been a movement to change the rules to allow the creation of "legal practice
plus" and "linked partnerships." These new practice concepts will allow solici-
tors to join with non-lawyer partners and allow the formation of stronger alli-
ances than are currently permitted.
Id. at 116. Canada and Australia are following suit. Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidis-
ciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 220 n.5 (2000).
199. These firms operating in England may indeed have inspired the 1999 establish-
ment in the United States of the firm of McKee, Nelson, Ernst & Young, ostensibly estab-
lished with the financial assistance of Ernst & Young, though the full details of the
association were undisclosed. See generally Wolfman, supra note 87. Following the
2002 Enron scandals in the United States, which involved Arthur Andersen LLP, legisla-
tures and global markets put pressure on many arrangements of this type. As such, the
terrain is uncertain and is likely to change.
200. See ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 23.
201. See Samenwerkingsverordening 1993, arts. 3, 4, 6 (Neth.).
202. See infra Part IID.
203. § 21g RAO Rechtsanwaltsordnung RGBI 96/1868 (Ger.), available at http://
www.rechtsanwaelte.at/downloads/rao.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). I am grateful to
Dr. Alexander Christian of the Austrian Bar Association (Osterreicher Rechtsanwalt-
skammertag) for assisting me with information on the Austrian position.
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COUNTRY STATUS GOVERNING LAW REMARKS
of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek/Code successors have not,
judiciaire (Code of Judicial however, made any
Organization, Civil Procedure, regulations authoriz-
etc.) as amended by Law of ing MDP. 2 0 4
Belgium July 4, 2001. This Regulation
(cont'd) provides that only the General
Council of the National Bar
Association is authorized to
determine with what other lib-
eral professions lawyers may
enter into partnerships. No
such professions have been des-
ignated.
Denmark Prohibited Section 124, paragraph 1 of the Breach of Section
Danish Administration of Jus- 124 is a criminal
tice Act (Retsplejeloven 124, stk. offence. 2 0 5
1) 1916, as amended.
Finland Prohibited Section 5, paragraph 2 of the No change of atti-
Act on Advocates, 1958. It pro- tude towards such
hibits a partnership with non- permits is antici-
lawyers unless the Board of the pated.
2 0 7
National Bar Association grants
a permit based on specific
grounds. No such permit has
been granted.
20 6
Iceland Prohibited Article 19 of the Icelandic Attor- The Ministry of Jus-
ney Law No. 77/1998. The pro- tice can give an
hibition is also contained in exemption under spe-
Codex Ethicus of the Icelandic cial circum-
Bar Association in Article stances.
20 9
204. See Reglement du 18 juin 2003 Relatif A l'exercice en Commun de la Profession
d'avocat (Fr.), available at http://obfg.be/deo/REGLEMENT%20DU%2018%20JUIN%
202003%20RELATIF%20A%20L.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). The former National
Bar Association has been replaced by a Dutch-speaking bar association (Orde van
Vlaamse Balies) and French-speaking Bar Association (Ordre des barreaux francophone
et germanophone), regulating lawyers in the Dutch and French areas of the country.
Neither of these bodies has made any provision for MDP under the enabling powers they
inherited. There are, however, law firms linked ostensibly and informally to some of the
Big 5, notably KPMG and Ernst & Young. I am grateful to Kurt van Damme, Researcher
with the Orde van Vlaamse Balies, Brussels, for his research assistance on this issue.
205. 1 am very grateful to Erik Kjaer-Hansen of the Danish Bar (L.L.M candidate,
Harvard Law School) for information and the patient translation of Danish materials. I
am also grateful to Henrik Bonne of the Danish Bar and Law Society, Copenhagen, for
responding to my inquiries on MDP. See also LIN PATERSON ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR
ADVANCE STUDIES, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION IN THE FIELD OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS
IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES: REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 136, at http://euro
pa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/prof services/prof servicesihs.part_2.pdf
(Jan. 2003) (discussing regulation of law firms in Denmark).
206. Advocates Act of 1958, AsK 496/1958, available at http://www.asianajajat.fi/
asp/empty.asp? (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
207. Olli Tarka of the Finnish Bar Association provided information on the Finnish
situation, for which I am grateful.
208. See Icelandic Attorney Law No. 77/1998 (on file with author); CODEX ETHICUS
art. 38, available at http://www.lmfi.is/code.asp?menuid=18 (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
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MDP
COUNTRY STATUS GOVERNING LAW REMARKS
38.208
Italy Permitted Law No. 1815 of November 23,
1939, adopted by the Parlia-
ment.
2 10
Ireland Uncertain Section 59 of the Solicitors Act Section 59 seems pri-
1954, as amended, effectively marily designed to
prohibits solicitors from having prevent lawyers from
agencies and partnerships with aiding unauthorized
non-lawyers in the course of practice as solicitors
practicing as solicitors. How- by the laity. In real-
ever, it is not expressly stated ity, it seems highly
that, when not holding them- improbable that a
selves out as solicitors, lawyers partnership with
may not offer legal services non-lawyers would
with non-lawyers, especially as not infringe the pro-
employees. 2 1 1  visions, even if they
do not hold them-
selves out as solici-
tors. This may turn
ultimately on the
nuances of lawyers'
internal codes of eth-
ics concerning do's
and don'ts even
when a solicitor is
not using his official
title.
Liechtenstein Uncertain Code on Lawyers, Art. 10, 11 Although MDP is not
RAG. These provisions are not expressly forbidden,
express on the subject. the conclusion from
a reading of salient
provisions of the
Code on Lawyers
seems to be that it is
forbidden.1Z12
Luxembourg Prohibited Tacit prohibition by Article 34
(1) of the Law on Legal Profes-
209. 1 am very grateful to Ingiridur Ludviksdottir and Birgir M. Ragnarsson for infor-
mation on the Icelandic situation.
210. See Law of 23 November 1938 No. 1815 (on file with author). The information
was derived from a table on MDP prepared by the CCBE and provided by Peter
McNamee, a legal assistant with the CCBE, Brussels, entitled "National Situations
Regarding Multidisciplinary Partnerships-Table Based on Information Given by the
CCBE National Delegations" (Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
211. See Solicitors Act of 1954, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/front.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2004). The Irish position is somewhat analogous to the English
position because lawyers enjoy no monopoly of legal advice, but rather that of profes-
sional title. There are, however, "independent" law firms with more or less formal affilia-
tions to some of the Big 5. Alma Clissmann, Parliamentary and Law Reform Executive,
Irish Law Society, provided useful information on Ireland, for which I am grateful.
212. See Letters from Dr. Ursula Wachter of the Liechtenstein Rectsanwaltskammer to
the author (Aug. 12, 2002 & Oct. 10, 2002) (on file with author).
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COUNTRY STATUS GOVERNING LAW REMARKS
sion of August 10, 1991.213
Norway Permitted Sections 231 and 232 of the
Courts of Law Act, Chapter 11.
Legal practice may be carried
on by virtue of a license other
than the advocate's license. In
that scenario, § 231 permits
combinations between advo-
cates and the non-advocates
Norway who practice without the advo-
(cont'd) cate's license. 2 1 4
Sweden Prohibited Chapter 8, §§ 2 and 4 of the In line with Bar
Swedish Code of Judicial Proce- Council policy state-
dure 1942, as amended. 2 1 5  ments, exemptions
The Council of the Swedish Bar will be made only for
Association is authorized, upon foreign lawyers from
application, to grant an exemp- jurisdictions with a
tion from this restriction. Sec- comparable deontol-
tion 3 of the Code of Conduct ogy.
2 17
for Lawyers, issued by the
Council on November 9, 1984,
reinforces this by stipulating
that a law partnership or com-
pany may have only the prac-
tice of law as its business.
2 1 6
The above survey of key European jurisdictions indicates a regulatory
environment in a state of flux. Like every new idea, views and positions
differ on this issue. Legal recognition of MDP exists in some jurisdictions,
notably Germany and France. In many other jurisdictions, including Den-
mark and England, MDP is expressly prohibited. Yet, in a third group of
countries, uncertainty exists as to whether there is a legal prohibition-
uncertainty leading either to de facto prohibition or de facto permissibility,
depending on the balance of social forces and norms. For example, until
the 2001 revision of the relevant laws, Spain was a jurisdiction where MDP
213. Law A-N58 of Aug. 10, 1991, 1991 J.O. 1116 (Lux.). The information was
derived from a table on MDP prepared by the CCBE and provided by Peter McNamee, a
legal assistant with the CCBE, Brussels, entitled "National Situations Regarding Mul-
tidisciplinary Partnerships-Table Based on Information Given by the CCBE National
Delegations" (Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
214. Wenche Siewers of the Norwegian Bar Association, Den Norske Advokatforen-
ing, graciously provided information and materials on the regulatory situation in Nor-
way (on file with author).
215. See Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure (1942), reprinted in 24 AMERICAN SERIES
OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Anders Bruzelius & Krister Thelin eds., rev. ed. 1979).
216. SWEDISH BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS art. 3 (Nov. 9, 1984),
available at http://www.advokatsamfundet.se/platform/components/upload/consume/
streamFile.asp?id=308 (last visited Mar. 22, 2004); see also Bernard Michael Ortwein II,
The Swedish Legal System: An Introduction, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405, 441-42
(2003) (discussing provisions of Swedish Code of Conduct).
217. Katarina Rosen of the Swedish Advokatsamfundet provided useful information
on the Swedish position, for which I am grateful (on file with author).
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was permissible de facto even though the laws did not clearly authorize it,
whereas Ireland seems to be a place where it is prohibited de facto, since
the laws appear not to expressly prohibit it despite indications to the con-
trary. In many countries where MDP is permitted, the permission is nar-
rowly drawn and restricted to certain regulated professions-for example,
Netherlands and Germany, where it is restricted to a few law-related profes-
sions. That these regulated professions largely perform functions that in
the U.S. system would fall within the lawyer's province should ordinarily
give pause to proponents of broadly conceived MDP; for it is arguable that
the character of the professions permitted to form MDPs with lawyers in
these European jurisdictions is indicative of a quest to achieve synergy of a
type that the U.S. legal profession has already achieved through an inte-
grated bar. A measure of mootness may, therefore, attend the proposals for
MDP in the United States, to the extent that they are predicated on the
situation in European jurisdictions.
The MDP situation in Europe will remain in flux for some time, with
jurisdictions adjusting their positions as necessary. Even in Germany, for
instance, where MDP is fairly well established, recent developments have
opened the possibility for regulatory reviews. 2 18 What is clear, however, is
that de-proscription of MDP is not a bandwagon upon which most jurisdic-
tions have jumped. From the active participation of European regulators in
the hearings before the ABA MDP Commission, the developments in the
United States would seem to influence many European jurisdictions.
A major conceptual obstacle in determining the degree to which MDP
has become pervasive in Europe and elsewhere is the constant conflation
of MDP and the surrounding issues with the question of unauthorized
practice of law. Both issues are, however, conceptually distinct, even if
related. The rules relating to unauthorized practice pertain to the lawyer's
monopoly on the right to offer legal services to the public. Such rules seek
to prevent non-lawyers from offering legal services to third parties. MDPs,
on the other hand, pertain to the right of non-lawyers to collaborate with
lawyers in offering legal services to third parties. It is thus possible to have
one without the other. A jurisdiction may permit "unauthorized" practice,
in the sense of granting non-lawyers the right to offer legal services, while
at the same time prohibiting lawyers from partnering with such non-law-
yers in the practice of law. A good example is the English solicitor who has
traditionally not been permitted to practice law in partnership with non-
lawyers, even though solicitors enjoy no monopoly over legal services. 2 19
It is also conceptually possible to permit MDP while prohibiting unautho-
rized practice. This would be the case where only those non-lawyers who
collaborate with lawyers are allowed to practice law. A good example is
Germany, where a lawyer who is qualified in another EU jurisdiction (tech-
nically a non-lawyer in Germany) is permitted to represent clients in court
218. See e-mail from W. Eichele, Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, to the author (Aug. 1,
2002) (on file with author) (indicating that MDP with auditors may be reviewed in light
of the Enron Corporation accounting scandals in 2002).
219. See supra text accompanying note 190. ,
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under the EU Services Directive, subject to the requirement that such a
visiting lawyer practice in conjunction with a German lawyer. 220 The fail-
ure to make this conceptual distinction leads to an inflation of the degree
to which MDP has become a feature of several jurisdictions-the absence of
rules regarding unauthorized practice is equated to the absence of prohibi-
tions against MDP. 2 2 1
D. European Judicial Pronouncements on MDP
Key decisions of European courts, especially ECJ, have significantly
helped to shape the current liberalized regime of trade in legal services in
Europe. ECJ's cases in this area stretch from Reyners v. Belgian State,2 22
decided in 1974, to the more recent Conte v. Rossi 22 3 and Criminal Proceed-
ings Against Ardiuno,2 24 decided in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The
220. The Lawyers' Services Directive permitted the host country to require a visiting
lawyer to act in conjunction with a local lawyer for purposes of court representation
(Art. 5) but did not impose such a requirement for legal advisory work. See Lawyers'
Services Directive, supra note 59. Even in relation to court representation, however, the
decision of the ECJ in Case 427/85, Commission v. Germany, E.C.R. 1123 (1988), has
curbed the German restriction through a restrictive interpretation of Article 5 of the
Lawyers' Services Directive. Id. at 1159. The ECJ held that Germany could not require
such a visiting lawyer to practice in conjunction with a German lawyer in situations
where a litigant is entitled to represent himself in court. Id. Similar restrictions exist in
all EU countries, except Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. See ADAMSON, supra note 45, at
48. It has been suggested that, if expanded, this ruling potentially nullifies the effect of
Article 5, since in the UK, for instance, a litigant is entitled to represent himself in most
cases before the courts. Id. at 53.
221. See Mullerat, supra note 133, para. VI (9) (reporting that an MDP survey by the
International Bar Association (IBA) showed that banks and insurance companies that
render legal services were counted as MDPs); see also Ward Bower, Multidisciplinary
Practices- The Future, in GLOBAL LAW IN PRACTICE 155, 158 (. Ross Harper ed., 1997)
(providing details of a similar report of an IBA survey).
222. Case C-2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631. For some of the subse-
quent cases decided in the liberalizing spirit of Reyners, see supra cases accompanying
note 60. See also ADAMSON, supra note 45, at 34.
223. Case C-221/99, Conte v. Rossi, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9359. The case involved a claim of
professional fees, which were charged according to a scale of fees and emoluments for
engineers and architects laid down by decree of the Minister for Justice. The issue was
whether Articles 5 and 85 (now Articles 10 and 81) of the EC Treaty preclude national
legislation that provides that the members of a profession may set at their discretion the
fees for certain services. Id. para. 27. The Court opined that the services involved in
this case were effectively services in respect of which architects had discretion to charge
specific fees for each service rendered and could not promote anticompetitive agree-
ments. Id. The Court held that Articles 5 and 85 do not preclude national legislation
allowing professionals to set discretionary fees. Id. para. 28.
224. Case C-35/99, Criminal Proceedings Against Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1529. The
issues in the case were whether Articles 5 and 85 (now Articles 10 and 81) of the EC
Treaty preclude a member state from adopting a law or regulation that approves, on the
basis of a draft produced by a professional body of the bar, a tariff, fixing minimum and
maximum fees for professionals, and whether that approval forms part of a procedure
that left ultimate approval authority for the tariff in the hands of public authorities, even
if the governing statutes (as in this case) did not expressly lay down public interest
criteria which the professional body must take into account in setting the tariff. Id. 9
32. The Court answered this question in the negative, thus saving the Italian state mea-
sure in issue. Id. para. 44.
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Reyners case effectively invalidated the nationality requirement for admis-
sion to the bar of member states. 225 It established that the legal profession
was amenable to EC trade disciplines in the same way as other areas of
enterprise, notwithstanding that the profession may at times qualify for
exemption from those trade disciplines under Article 55 of the EC Treaty
for activities that are connected with the exercise of official authority. It
opened the way for a series of subsequent liberalizing decisions applying
the EC Treaty provisions on the right of establishment and services to the
legal profession on the same terms as other professions and enterprises. In
both the Conte and Ardiuno cases, however, the ECJ, in rather narrowly
drawn decisions, held that certain measures by the Italian government
devolving minimum and maximum fee-setting powers to professional
groups did not offend relevant Community legislation.
2 26
Although the decisions in Conte and Arduino are limited to a particular
set of facts, they are nonetheless significant. Together they indicate a halt
in the long march of liberalization evinced by nearly three decades of ECJ
jurisprudence-a turning point in the long line of cases liberalizing the
professional services regime through the abrogation of laws and profes-
sional rules perceived to inhibit competition. They mark the ECJ's shift
toward the establishment of an optimal regulatory regime for professional
services within the EU, indicating that the threshold has been reached
where liberalization may have to be more substantially attenuated by con-
siderations going beyond market economics.
While the foregoing cases are key in the area of professional services,
forming a backdrop against which issues pertaining to MDP are likely to be
examined and decided, their effect on the MDP question is indirect. More
important is the case Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde
van Advocaten, decided on February 19, 2002, the same day as Arduino.
22 7
Wouters reinforces, within the MDP context, the new direction indicated by
prior cases and is all the more important because it deals directly with
MDP, not just legal services.
1. Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten
The Netherlands Council of State (the Nederlandse Raad van State)
referred Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on several questions of Community
law. 2 28 Brought before the Netherlands Council of State on appeal from
the lower courts, this case concerned the legality of a 1993 regulation
adopted by the Bar of the Netherlands (the Nederlandse Orde van Advo-
caten). The regulation at issue effectively prohibited lawyers from entering
into multidisciplinary partnerships with accountants, while allowing such
partnership between lawyers and other selected professions, notably tax
225. See Reyners, 1974 E.C.R. 631.
226. See Conte, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9359; Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1529.
227. Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advo-
caten, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (2002).
228. Id. 1.
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consultants, notaries, and patent agents. 229 The Nederlandse Raad van
State referred nine questions, also raised by the parties at the prior pro-
ceedings, to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.230
A threshold question decided by the ECJ was whether the Bar of the
Netherlands qualified as an association of undertakings under Article
85(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 81(1)) and, if so, whether Article 90(2)
(now Article 86(2)) applied to it.23 1 Article 90(2) contains an exemption
for undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest, where the application of EC rules (especially the rules on
competition) would obstruct the performance of the particular tasks
assigned to such undertakings. The ECJ had to address these issues in this
case, which it had side-stepped in Conte and Arduino -where questions had
also arisen as to whether the professional associations involved in those
cases qualified as associations of undertakings under Article 85 of the EC
Treaty. The Court held that registered members of the Netherlands bar
carry on an economic activity and, as a consequence, the Bar of the Nether-
lands is an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 85,
notwithstanding that the association exercised regulatory powers in imple-
menting its rules, such as the 1993 regulation. 232
The most pertinent questions raised in the Wouters case were whether
a prohibition on multidisciplinary partnerships involving members of the
229. Id. ' 22. In 1991, Mr. Wouters, a member of the Amsterdam Bar, became a
partner in Arthur Andersen & Co. Belastingadviseurs (a partnership of tax consultants).
Id. 1 24. Late in 1994, he informed the Supervisory Board of the Rotterdam Bar that he
wanted to enroll at the Rotterdam Bar and to practice there under the name of "Arthur
Andersen & Co., advocaten en belastingadviseurs." Id. On July 27, 1995, the Supervi-
sory Board found that the members of the partnership Arthur Andersen & Co. Belastin-
gadviseurs were in professional partnership under the 1993 Regulation with .the
members of the partnership Arthur Andersen & Co. Accountants, that is to say with
members of the accounting profession. Id. ' 25. Accordingly, Mr. Wouters breached
Article 4 of the 1993 Regulation, id., that precluded members of the bar from entering or
maintaining any professional partnerships, unless the primary purpose of each part-
ner's profession was the practice of law. Id. 1 16. Mr. Wouters, Arthur Andersen & Co.
Belastingadviseurs, and Arthur Andersen & Co. Accountants appealed the decision. Id.
91 26. Mr. Savelbergh, a member of the Amsterdam Bar, similarly informed the Supervi-
sory Board of the Amsterdam Bar in the beginning of 1995 that he intended to enter into
partnership with "Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV, a subsidiary of the interna-
tional undertaking Price Waterhouse, which includes both tax consultants and account-
ants." Id. 91 27. On July 5, 1995, the Supervisory Board declared that the proposed
partnership was contrary to Article 4 of the 1993 Regulation, id. C1 28, which allowed
lawyers to form professional partnerships only with other members of the Netherlands
bar or with foreign lawyers under certain conditions. Id. 9[ 17. All parties ultimately
appealed the decision up to the Nederlandse Raad van State, but Arthur Andersen & Co.
Belastingadviseurs and Arthur Andersen & Co. Accountants had to withdraw from the
proceedings on procedural grounds. Id. 1 35, 37. The specific procedural reason is
not clear from the text of the ECJ decision itself because the decision not to allow them
to participate in the appeal was taken at the national court level. See MacCrate Report,
supra note 54, at 223 (stating that the district court rejected the appeal by Arthur Ander-
sen because it did not make "an intermediate appeal of the supervisory body decision to
the Order's General Council").
230. Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, 11 1-2.
231. Id. 91 44.
232. Id. 191 49, 58, 71.
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bar and accountants constitutes a restriction on competition, the right of
establishment, or the freedom to provide services. 23 3 The Court ruled that
the prohibition of MDPs with accountants restricted competition and intra-
Community trade.2 34 Echoing the major thrust of the broader arguments
of MDP proponents, the Court observed the following:
As regards the adverse effect on competition, the areas of expertise of mem-
bers of the Bar and of accountants may be complementary. Since legal ser-
vices, especially in business law, more and more frequently require recourse
to an accountant, a multi-disciplinary partnership of members of the Bar
and accountants would make it possible to offer a wider range of services,
and indeed to propose new ones. Clients would thus be able to turn to a
single structure for a large part of the services necessary for the organisation
[sic], management and operation of their business (the 'one-stop shop'
advantage).
Furthermore, a multi-disciplinary partnership of members of the Bar and
accountants would be capable of satisfying the needs created by the increas-
ing interpenetration of national markets and the consequent necessity for
continuous adaptation to national and international legislation.
Nor, finally, is it inconceivable that the economies of scale resulting from
such multi-disciplinary partnerships might have positive effects on the cost
of services.2 35
Nevertheless, the Court went on to conclude that regulation does not
infringe Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty because the Netherlands bar could
reasonably have considered that the regulation, despite its inherent restric-
tive effects on competition, "is necessary for the proper practice of the legal
profession. '
2 36
In essence, the Court opined that the purpose of the Regulation was
not necessarily to inhibit competition within Article 85, even if the Regula-
tion did in fact have anti-competitive results. Here at last was judicial rec-
ognition, albeit within the context of EU statutory provisions, that the rules
of a bar organization restricting competition by prohibiting MDP could
embody other values that suffice to justify their retention. 2 37 Thus, in this
233. See id. 11 39 (4)-(8).
234. Id. 1 86, 90, 94.
235. Id. 1 87-89. In reaching its conclusion, the Court disagreed with the Luxem-
bourg Government (one of the interveners in the case) that the prohibition of MDP had a
positive rather than a restrictive effect on competition. Id. 1 85. The Luxembourg Gov-
ernment argued that by forbidding bar members from entering into partnership with
accountants, "the national rules in issue in the main proceedings made it possible to
prevent the legal services offered by members of the Bar from being concentrated in the
hands of a few large international firms and, consequently, to maintain a large number
of operators on the market." Id. The Court rejected this argument by pointing out that
MDPs could increase the range of services, the interpenetration of national markets, and
the cost of services. Id. 19 87-89. The Court went on to conclude that, though unlim-
ited multidisciplinary partnerships between the legal profession and a highly concen-
trated accountancy could lead to a decrease in competition, a measure short of absolute
prohibition could guarantee a "sufficient degree of competition on the market in legal
services." Id. 99 93-94.
236. Id. 9 110.
237. Id. 1 97.
Cornell International Law Journal
decision, the Court further reinforced its new disposition towards liberali-
zation, as marked by the Arduino and Conte decisions, and delivered a coup
de grdce: It made an important distinction between the anticompetitive
effect of a professional rule or regulation and the purpose of the rule, the
former being something that is not necessarily a function of the latter.2 38
MDP commentators do not emphasize this distinction; rather, they rou-
tinely conflate the anticompetitive effect of a ban on MDP with an anticom-
petitive purpose of the organized bar.23 9 For such commentators,
anticompetitive effects are coterminous with anticompetitive intendment.
The Court's ruling essentially rejects the arguments of those who seek to
ascribe an anticompetitive intent to the bar's rules on MDP solely from
their anticompetitive effects and to dispose of those rules on that account,
as if such anticompetitive effects were mutually exclusive with other benign
purposes and dispositive of the matter. For such MDP proponents,
anticompetitive effects seem incapable of juxtaposition with other values, a
consideration of which would diminish the import of such effects.
On the question of whether the 1993 Regulation infringed Articles 52
(now Article 43) and 59 (now Article 49) of the Treaty, which confer the
right of establishment and freedom to provide services, the Court first
assumed that these provisions applied to a prohibition of any multidiscipli-
nary partnerships between lawyers and accountants and that the Regula-
tion constituted a restriction on one or both of those freedoms. 240 The ECJ
then held that the restriction would in any event be justified based on the
Court's analysis of Article 85(1).241 The Court reasoned that "not every
agreement between undertakings or any decision of an association of
undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one
of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1)
of the Treaty."'2 42 Courts should consider the context of the rules, their
effects and objectives, "whether the consequential effects restrictive of com-
petition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives," and the relevant
legal framework. 243 In addition, the Netherlands bar was entitled to con-
sider that its members would not be able to give independent legal advice if
they were part of an organization that was also responsible for financial
affairs of the client on the same matter.244 The Court concluded that the
resulting restrictions on competition did not go beyond what was neces-
sary for "the proper practice of the legal profession. '24 5
238. See id.
239. See Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 Bus. LAw. 951, 969-73
(2000).
240. See Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, 122.
241. Id.
242. Id. l 97.
243. Id. c 97-98. The Court emphasized that the members of the Netherlands bar
are required to be independent from public authorities and third parties and that, by
contrast, accountants are not subject to comparable requirements of professional con-
duct. Id. 11 100-103.
244. Id. l 105.
245. Id. c1cl 107, 109.
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This aspect of the ECJ's decision was in effect a ruling based on the
proportionality test developed earlier by the Court.24 6 The bar regulation
in Wouters was justified because it was reasonably necessary for the proper
practice of the legal profession as organized in the Netherlands. 2 47 The
Court sidestepped a consideration of the exception pertaining to the right
of establishment, as enshrined in Article 55 (now Article 45) of the Treaty,
for activities connected with the exercise of official authority. Thus, an
opportunity was lost to consider in depth the social policy imperatives that
can legitimately inform the prohibition of MDP in a jurisdiction. The ECJ's
decision on Article 85(1) obviously touched this issue, but its focus was
clearly on the purpose behind the prohibition of lawyer-accountant MDPs
by the Dutch bar, as an indication of a lack of anticompetitive purpose by
the bar. While the implications of such purpose can be drawn out to cover
an enunciation of the social policy imperatives behind the prohibition of
MDP (as the Court did in the Wouters case), the exception in Article 55
provides more ample opportunities to do so not only by looking at the bar's
purposes in prohibiting MDP, but, more importantly, by looking at the
connection between such purposes and the broader imperatives of order-
ing and securing the body politics. The latter is an exercise within the
realm of politics and political theory, while a focus on the bar's rules and
their contours in and of itself is substantially an economic 24 8 (or at the
least non-political) justification.
The relevant portion of Article 85(1) focuses largely on the object
behind the rule or regulation, and a party, in order to comply, can show
that an otherwise anticompetitive rule by an association of undertakings
has an alternative competitive purpose. That alternative purpose need not
have any political dimensions, quite unlike a consideration of those pur-
poses as a dimension of the exercise of official (political) authority under
the exception in Article 55. Indeed, even with regard to a business and
economic justification, a consideration of the exception in Article 90(2)
would likely have yielded richer results. The ECJ, however, declined to
consider the question of whether the Bar of the Netherlands fell under the
exception of Article 90(2). It is instructive, however, that Advocate General
Leger accepted that "lawyers may be regarded as undertakings 'entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest within the
meaning of Article 90(2) of the Treaty." 249
246. See, e.g., Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165. The ECJ held that national measures that can
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
EC Treaty must fulfill four conditions. Id. 37. The measures must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general
interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they
pursue; and the measures must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the
objective. Id.
247. Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, 107, 109.
248. The Court's ruling in Wouters could be interpreted as confirming that the bar's
rules prohibiting MDP were in conformity with the usual terms by which market partici-
pants' rules are validated.
249. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Leger in Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, ' 172.
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A pertinent aspect of the Wouters case is that it goes beyond the thresh-
old question of whether MDP should be permitted, even though the Court
did not consider this question, perhaps on the tacit understanding that it
was well within the prerogative of any EU jurisdiction to prohibit the for-
mation of MDPs as permitted by Article 11(5) of the Establishment Direc-
tive.2 50 Indeed, commenting on the import of some other jurisdictions'
comparable treatment of MDP, the Court indicated the following:
[T]he fact that different rules may be applicable in another Member State
does not mean that the rules in force in the former State are incompatible
with Community law. ... Even if multi-disciplinary partnerships of lawyers
and accountants are allowed in some Member States, the Bar of the Nether-
lands is entitled to consider that the objectives pursued by the 1993 Regula-
tion cannot, having regard in particular to the legal regimes by which
members of the Bar and accountants are respectively governed in the Nether-
lands, be attained by less restrictive means .... 251
In addition, beyond the threshold question of MDP permissibility, this
case raises the issue of determining the detailed contours of the regulations
governing MDP, especially the occupational groups with which lawyers
may form MDPs. It is arguable, however, that the ECJ's confirmation that
the bar can regulate MDPs in this manner is an implied confirmation that,
upon showing the necessity, the bar can place an absolute prohibition on
MDPs irrespective of the profession involved, such prohibition being but
one form of regulation. In reality, no supranational rule of EU Treaty law
or ECJ jurisprudence prevents a state from prohibiting MDPs.
2. Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 252 though not a decision of the ECJ, is
one of the cases that shaped the debate on MDP in Europe. So widespread
was its impact that it has been the subject of a series of case studies on
professional service firms. 2 53 The case involved an application for breach
of confidence brought by Prince Jefri against KPMG, asking to restrain
KPMG from acting for the Brunei Investment Agency (B.I.A.) and any other
person who had an interest adverse to that of Prince Jefri.2 54 The Court of
First Instance granted the application. 25 5 Upon appeal by KPMG to the
English Court of Appeal, the first court's order was vacated, but the House
of Lords granted Prince Jefri's appeal and effectively reinstated the
250. See supra text accompanying note 97.
251. Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, 108.
252. Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 2 A.C. 222 (1999). The case began at the Chan-
cery Division before Judge Pumfrey. See Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 1 BCLC 1 (Ch.
1999), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. Judge Pumfrey ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, whereupon the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal. See Prince Jefri
Bolkiah v. KPMG, 1 BCLC 1 (C.A. 1999). The House of Lords decision-the most impor-
tant and most referenced of the three decisions-resulted from defendant's subsequent
appeal.
253. See NANDA, supra note 23.
254. Prince Jefri Bolkiah, 2 A.C. at 223.
255. Id.
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The facts of the case and the surrounding circumstances are as long as
they are interesting. 257 Prince Jefri was chairman of the B.I.A., which was
established in 1983 to hold and manage the general reserve fund and exter-
nal assets of the Government of Brunei and to provide the government with
money management services.25 8 Since 1983, KPMG annually audited the
agency's core funds and provided consulting services to B.I.A. 2 59 While
acting for B.I.A. in these capacities, KPMG accepted a retainer from Prince
Jefri to perform substantial investigation in connection with litigation
involving Prince Jefri's companies and certain Manoukian brothers (the
"Manoukian litigation"). 260 For the purpose of this investigation (named
"Project Lucy"), KPMG rendered forensic accounting services to Prince
Jefri, examining and acquiring a detailed knowledge of his personal
finances, including identity and location of assets and the vehicles in
which they were held.2 6 1 This was necessary to enable KPMG to compile
an expert report-a key product of the broader litigation support services
rendered by KPMG to Prince Jefri for purposes of the Manoukian litigation.
The litigation support services interviewed witnesses, searched for docu-
ments, investigated the facts, participated in conferences with counsel,
reviewed draft pleadings, and prepared questions for cross-examination-
all core aspects of a solicitor's function in the litigation context. 26 2 Alto-
gether, KPMG deployed 168 personnel and earned approximately £4.6 mil-
lion for services rendered to Prince Jefri between 1996 and 1998.263
In June 1998, after the Brunei Government relieved Prince Jefri of his
position as B.I.A. chairperson and the Manoukian litigation had been set-
tled, a finance task force was appointed to investigate the activities of
B.I.A.26 4 KPMG was retained by B.I.A. to assist in investigating special
transfers of assets from B.I.A ("Project Gemma"). 2 65 Under the circum-
stances, it was obvious that the interests of Prince Jefri were adverse to
those of B.I.A. and that some of the confidential information obtained by
KPMG in the course of Project Lucy would be relevant to Project
Gemma. 26 6 KPMG did not inform Prince Jefri of this assignment, nor did
it seek his consent to the firm's acceptance of the assignment. 26 7 KPMG
employed approximately fifty people on Project Gemma, eleven of whom
had worked for Prince Jefri. KPMG contended, however, that none of the
256. Id.
257. For an account of the historical and political circumstances that formed a back-
ground to the litigation, see NANDA, supra note 23.
258. Prince Jefri Bolkiah, 2 A.C. at 228.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 229.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 230.
265. Id. at 230-31.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 231.
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employees possessed information confidential to Prince Jefri. 2 68 More
broadly, KPMG averred that it had set an ethical screen, more popularly
referred to as a "Chinese wall," between those who had worked on Project
Lucy and those who worked on Project Gemma to prevent dissimilation of
confidential information concerning Prince Jefri between the two
groups.2 69 The Chinese wall had two components: First, only those who
did not possess confidential information were permitted to work on Project
Gemma, and second, steps were taken to avoid the risk that such informa-
tion could become available to those working on Project Gemma in the
future.270
Judge Pumfrey, at the Chancery Division, took some bold juridical
strides. First, he observed that it was fair to say that KPMG had taken all
the steps that could be expected to minimize or avoid any disclosure of
Prince Jefri's confidential information. 2 7 1 However, the ultimate issue was
whether these steps were indeed sufficient. To answer this question, the
Court observed that prior cases did not address the issue of the ethical
standards to be applied when accountants undertake forensic services. 27 2
Nevertheless, because prior cases addressed the position of solicitors
undertaking such activities, the Court had no qualms about extending the
law on solicitors to accountants undertaking the same services, 273 not-
withstanding the differences between accountants and solicitors-the latter
being officers of the Court.
2 74
Having established that the same standards of confidentiality applied
to accountants and solicitors performing forensic services, the Court
stated that, where accountants have received confidential information in
the course of providing forensic services, "the burden [was] upon the
accountant to establish that there [was] no real risk of a communication of
any of the relevant information. '2 75 The Court also shared the skepticism
expressed by other courts that Chinese walls could be efficient, stating that
"the intrinsic difficulty with Chinese walls is that, while they are well
adapted to deal with foreseeable or deliberate disclosure of information,
they are not well adapted to deal with disclosure which is accidental, inad-
vertent or negligent." 276 The Court concluded that, because there was evi-
dence that some confidential information may be disclosed if KPMG were
allowed to proceed and because no compelling reasons warranted its dis-
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 232.
272. See Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 1 BCLC 1 (Ch. 1999), available at http://
www.lexisnexis.com.
273. Id.
274. Id. The Court pointed out that there was no rational basis for distinguishing
between the duty owed by an accountant to his client and that owed him by his solicitor
or counsel in the context of forensic services, performance of tasks which can be under-
taken by solicitors, giving and receiving of advice, and in relation to the conduct of
litigation or threatened litigation. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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closure, the former client should not be exposed to the risk of inadvertent
disclosure.2 77 The House of Lords unanimously endorsed the reasoning of
the Chancery Division and emphasized that an effective Chinese wall must
be established as an aspect of the organizational structure of the firm and
not created ad hoc, as was the case with Projects Lucy and Gemma. 2 78
The significance of this case for the MDP debate stems in large part
from the centrality of Chinese walls to the operations of the global account-
ing firms and similar organizations that champion the propagation of
MDPs. This structure has played a primary, though not exclusive, part in
enabling such firms to grow into behemoth enterprises, transcending com-
parable law firms in size and global influence. The wide acceptance and
use of Chinese walls in the accounting and financial services sector has
meant that in some situations, such as Project Gemma, where considera-
tions of conflict of interest or risk to client confidentiality would be suffi-
cient to dissuade a law firm from accepting an engagement, financial
services and accounting firms could proceed undeterred, relying on the
assumed efficacy of Chinese walls. In the context of the MDP debate, a
central issue has always been whether the joint practice between legal and
other professions, especially accounting, would jeopardize ethical princi-
ples related to confidentiality and conflicts of interest. The primary
response of MDP proponents to this argument has been that the proce-
dures, such as Chinese walls, adopted by accounting and other firms are
sufficient to address these risks. 2 79 The decision in Prince Jefri Bolkiah
effectively neutralizes such arguments by exposing the inherent weak-
nesses of Chinese walls. It eliminates an important element in the wider
framework for global interprofessional expansion of the major accounting
firms that are the chief proponents of MDP.
It is instructive that Prince Jefri Bolkiah was decided in the context of
the more liberal English rules relating to conflicts of interest and confiden-
tiality. Lord Millet, who delivered the opinion of the House of Lords, sug-
gested the possibility of adjustment to these liberal rules, but declined to
affirm them except for the standards applicable to solicitors (and by exten-
sion accountants) regarding former client confidentiality. 2 80 The Court
277. Id.
278. See Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 2 A.C. 222, 239 (1999).
279. The other major alternative approach is to question the value and justification of
the legal profession's rules on confidentiality and conflict of interest. This is, however,
not a common approach outside the legal academia. For works that question values of
confidentiality, see Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, supra note 79, at 33; see also
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 7, at 334-36. For a brief review of academic works that ques-
tion the disinterestedness of lawyers' professional values, see Wilkins, Everyday Practice
Is the Troubling Case, supra note 79, at 82-83.
280. Prince Jefri Bolkiah overruled the decision in Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday & Clarke,
1 Ch. 831 (1912), which held that a court will not intervene in favor of a former client
who seeks to enjoin a solicitor from accepting a new client whose interests are adverse to
his, unless the court is satisfied that there is a "reasonable probability of real mischief."
See Prince Jefri Bolkiah, 2 A.C. at 236-37 (discussing the Rakusen test). The Court,
yielding to the criticism of this rule in some jurisdictions, concluded that the rule
imposed an unfair burden on the former client, exposed him to a potential and avoida-
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rejected the "absolute rule, such as that adopted in the United States, which
precludes a solicitor or his firm altogether from acting for a client with an
interest adverse to that of the former client in the same or a connected
matter."28' It also rejected the wide rule of imputation of conflicts availa-
ble in the United States, stating that "there is no cause to impute or attri-
bute the knowledge of one partner to his fellow partners. Whether a
particular individual is in possession of confidential information is a ques-
tion of fact which must be proved or inferred from the circumstances of the
case." 282 This rejection was based on the fact that English courts' jurisdic-
tion in cases where a former client seeks to enjoin a solicitor from acting
for a new client is premised not on the avoidance of conflicts of interest,
real or perceived, but on the duty of confidentiality. 283 When the client-
solicitor relationship ends, the solicitor has no obligation to defend or
advance the interest of his former client.28 4 A solicitor's duty of confidenti-
ality, whether founded on equity or contract, is, however, an unqualified
duty to keep the information confidential, "not merely to take all reasona-
ble steps to do so."285 That the English House of Lords, within this milieu
of relatively liberal professional ethics, could not find Chinese walls ade-
quate is indicative of the attenuated chances for those who offer legal ser-
vices within MDPs in other common law jurisdictions with stricter rules of
confidentiality or conflict of interest to successfully hide behind Chinese
walls.
Also significant is the House of Lords' rejection of the factual basis of
KPMG's claim. Like all "Big 5" firms, KPMG argued for some deference to
its internal control processes. It argued that it was accustomed to the protec-
tion of client confidences across practice areas and jurisdictions, given the
size of its operations. 28 6 Effectively, it argued for the Court's acceptance of
its ipse dixit as to the adequacy of its processes, not just in terms of the
industry or other standards, but also in terms of the real capacity of these
processes, notably the Chinese wall, to safeguard client confidentiality. 28 7
Lord Millet's rejection of its argument showed an uncommon understanding
of the practical, workaday operations of a multidisciplinary practice, espe-
cially of the "Big 5" type.28 8
ble risk to which he did not consent, and failed to give him sufficient assurance that his
confidences would be respected. Id. at 236. The Court then articulated a new test that
effectively strengthened confidentiality regarding former clients-"the court will inter-
vene unless it is satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure." Id. at 237.
281. Prince Jefri Bolkiah, 2 A.C. at 234.
282. Id. at 235.
283. Id. at 234.
284. Id. at 235.
285. Id. at 235.
286. Id. at 238.
287. See id.
288. The Court observed the following:
It is one thing, for example, to separate the insolvency, audit, taxation and foren-
sic departments from one another and erect Chinese walls between them. Such
departments often work from different offices and there may be relatively little
movement of personnel between them. But it is quite another to attempt to place
an information barrier between members all of whom are drawn from the same
department and have been accustomed to work with each other. I would expect
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The House of Lords thus recognized the problem of perpetual person-
nel turnover in a large Big 5 firm. Because the Court of Appeals agreed
with KPMG's arguments regarding the capacity of the Big 5 to maintain
reliable structures for the control of confidential information, 28 9 it over-
looked what position the staff flexibility occupies in the overall strategy of
the Big 5 and the difficulty of subjugating that need for flexibility to the
demanding dictates of lawyers' professional ethics. By being able to rear-
range and deploy staff flexibly, the Big 5 attain efficiency levels which they
otherwise could not attain. However, this pursuit of efficiency can trump
other considerations, including questions of confidentiality, in the day-to-
day business of the organization, as the facts of Prince Jefri Bolkiah
demonstrate.2 90
Finally, the case is significant in its reinforcement of the abiding, fun-
damental character of the ethical rules on confidentiality and conflicts of
interest that ground the independence of the legal profession. Indeed, it
effectively establishes the rule pertaining to confidentiality as a universal
rule applicable to all those who render legal services. The rule becomes
akin to an obligation assumed by anyone who chooses to render legal ser-
vices to the public-thus transcending its characterization in some quarters
as simply self-serving rules made by lawyers for lawyers' interests. 29 1 The
Chancery Division clearly expressed this point in its judgment,29 2 but it is
also implicit in the decision of the House of Lords, endorsing the extension
of solicitors' confidentiality standards to accountants who choose to render
legal services. Thus, opinions of both courts reinforce the core values of
the legal profession.
this to be particularly difficult where the department concerned is engaged in
the provision of litigation support services, and there is evidence to confirm
this. Forensic accountancy is said to be an area in which new and unusual
problems frequently arise and partners and managers are accustomed to share
information and expertise. Furthermore, there is evidence that physical segre-
gation is not necessarily adequate, especially where it is erected within a single
department.
Id. at 239.
289. Commenting on the judgment of Chancery Division, Lord Woolf (Waller dis-
senting) stated as follows:
[The opinion] underestimates the effect of exhortation and a culture where the
importance of the preservation of confidence is given high priority and there-
fore results in the judge attaching too much importance to not exposing the
former client to 'the risk of inadvertent or careless or negligent disclosure unless
there are powerful reasons for saying that he should.'
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 1 BCLC 1 (C.A. 1999). The judgment of Woolf and the
concurring judgment of Otton are suffused with expressions of faith in the culture and
processes of accounting firms. Id.
290. Those who are familiar with the workaday activities of Big 5 employees would
confirm that in the hustle and bustle of their average workday the confidentiality con-
cerns and related questions that preoccupy sedate lawyers would, as a matter of neces-
sity, be relegated to the background, if not entirely ignored.
291. See Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra
note 140, at 1145.
292. See PrinceJefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 1 BCLC 1 (Ch. 1999), available at http://www.
lexisnexis.com.
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Conclusion
Some of the incidences of the current preoccupation with globaliza-
tion and liberalization of trade in services may be seen as lending concep-
tual support to the need for MDP and the fairness of de-proscribing it.
They suggest that MDP may not be as radical a concession as it is some-
times thought to be, given conceptually similar concessions claimed and
received by lawyers across jurisdictions. Conclusions drawn from such
generalized suggestions are, however, misleading-there being as yet no
indication in transnational professional practice generally that MDP has
become imperative; nor is there such an indication within the context of
the specifics of the EU regime for legal services. The EU regime, in particu-
lar, under the Establishment Directive and through the ECJ's most recent
case law, leaves considerable room for each of its jurisdictions to restrain
the propagation of MDPs. Some have chosen to restrain it, while others, by
no means a preponderance of states, have chosen to permit such structures
for legal practice. Yet, in other states the regulatory situation is unclear,
either because the legislature has not completely articulated the regulatory
framework or because permission to engage in MDP is partial or half-
hearted. Ultimately, the decision to constrain or allow MDP would depend
on each jurisdiction's view of what is beneficial to its legal services sector.
It should never be presumed, however, that a particular position is com-
pelled or indicated by EU law or even by the exigencies of intracommunity
competition in the internal legal services market of the EU.
The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ is particularly germane. It indi-
cates the terminal point of the long march toward the market, which was
sanctioned and orchestrated by the Court's earlier jurisprudence between
the 1970s and 1990s in this area. Having established the legal profession's
amenability to the basic dictates of the market in its offer of legal services
to the public, the ECJ seems now set to delineate the parameters of the
profession's amenability to the market, by reinforcing the core attributes
that make the profession something more than a business. This new juris-
prudence is not very fertile ground for the propagation of MDP.
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